Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Self, Body and Coincidence' and 'Causation'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

14534	Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
	Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1
	A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

8406	Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
	Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
	A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8407	A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
	Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
	A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.