Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Personal Identity and Memory' and 'fragments/reports'

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5 ideas

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
1389 If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4)
     A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma.
1390 Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
     Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria.
     From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible?
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
1757 The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The 'Electra': Electra knows that Orestes is her brother, but not that this man is Orestes, so she knows and does not know her brother simultaneously.
     From: report of Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Eu.4
     A reaction: Hence we distinguish 'know of', 'know that' and 'know how'. Hence Russell makes 'knowledge by acquaintance' fundamental, and descriptions come later.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
3028 The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]
     Full Idea: The chief good is unity, which is known by several names, for at one time people call it prudence, at another time God, at another intellect, and so on.
     From: Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.9.2
     A reaction: So the chief good is what unites and focuses our moral actions. Kant calls that 'the will'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').