Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation' and 'Mind in a Physical World'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the domain where different languages, theories, explanations, and conceptual systems come together and have their mutual ontological relationships sorted out and clarified.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.066)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
     Full Idea: Examples where reductionism seems to give a good account of things are light, genes, temperature and transparency.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.025) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This a fairly simple examples, thoroughly confirmed by science a long time ago. Life is a nicer example, because it is more complex and less obvious, but pretty much beyond dispute these days.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
     Full Idea: It is customary to associate supervenience with the idea of dependence or determination.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.011)
     A reaction: It is only 'customary' because, in principle, the supervenience might just be a coincidence. I might follow someone everywhere because I love them (dependence) or because they force me to (determination). There's always a reason.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
     Full Idea: Mereological supervenience is the doctrine that wholes are fixed by the properties and relations that characterise their parts.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.018)
     A reaction: Presumably this would be the opposite of 'holism'. Personally I would take mereological supervenience to be not merely correct, but to be metaphysically necessary. Don't ask me to prove it, of course.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
     Full Idea: A plausible criterion for distinguishing what is real from what is not real is the possession of causal power.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.119)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
     Full Idea: Macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §3 p.085)
     A reaction: I don't see why the macro-powers 'go beyond' the sum of the micro-powers. Admittedly one molecule can't be slippery, but slipperiness can be totally reduced to molecule behaviour.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: What gives reality and stability to our knowledge is the reality and stability of the relations established between its parts..…by the differences and identities with other things which have similarly achieved comparative fixity and substantiality.
     From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: Although I don't sympathise with Green's idealist metaphysics, and nevertheless think that this internalist account of knowledge is correct.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
     Full Idea: There are two contradictory arguments about everything.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B06a), quoted by (who?) - where?
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
     Full Idea: Protagoras declares that it is possible to argue either side of any question with equal force, even the question whether or not one can equally argue either side of any question!
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998]) by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 088
     A reaction: This is perhaps the most famous sceptical argument in the ancient world (though, note, Protagoras is most famous for his relativism rather than his scepticism). It is, of course, wrong. The arguments are sometimes equal, but often they are not.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
     Full Idea: We do not agree that every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 183c
     A reaction: I fully agree with this, but only because I have an optimistic view that rational people converge on the truth.
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
     Full Idea: Why didn't he start 'Truth' off by saying "A pig is the measure of all things", or "a baboon",…or " tadpole"? That would have been a magnificently haughty beginning.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], B01) by Plato - Theaetetus 161d1
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
     Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes).
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
     Full Idea: It seems to me inconceivable that a possible world exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: Personally I can't conceive of such a world lacking qualia either. The physical entails the mental, say I.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
     Full Idea: There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
     Full Idea: It is possible to hold that phenomenal properties (qualia) are irreducible, while holding intentional properties, including propositional attitudes, to be reducible (functionally, or biologically).
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.017)
     A reaction: This is the position which Kim has settled for, but I find it baffling. If the universe is full of irreducibles that is one thing, but if everything in the universe is reducible except for one tiny item, that is implausible.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
     Full Idea: The emergentism (of Searle), like ethical intuitionism, views mind-body supervenience as something that admits no explanation - it is a brute fact.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.013)
     A reaction: This is why 'emergence' is no sort of theory, and is really old-fashioned dualism in a dubious naturalistic disguise. If mind 'emerges', there is presumably a causal mechanism for that.
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
     Full Idea: If emergentism is correct about anything, it is more likely to be correct about qualia than about anything else.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.103)
     A reaction: I'm puzzled by a view that says that nearly all of the mind is reducible, but one tiny aspect of it is 'emergent'. What sort of ontology is envisaged by that?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers saw in mind-body supervenience a satisfying metaphysical statement of physicalism without reductionism. This widely influential position is now known as "nonreductive physicalism".
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.008)
     A reaction: If two things supervene on one another, then we should be asking why. Occasionalism and Parallelism are presumably not the answer. Coldness supervenes on ice.
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
     Full Idea: Maybe strong supervenience is inconsistent with the irreducibility of the supervenient properties to their subvenient bases.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.012)
     A reaction: If two things are really very very supervenient on one another (superdupervenient?), then you have to ask WHY? If there isn't identity, then there is surely a highly lawlike connection?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
     Full Idea: The two principle arguments which overthrew the mind-brain identity theory were the multiple realization argument of Hilary Putnam, and the anomalist argument of Davidson, which contained the seeds of functionalism and anomalous monism.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §1 p.002)
     A reaction: The first argument strikes me as significant and interesting, but Davidson seems weak. It makes the unsubstantiated claim that mind is outside the laws of physics, and irreducible.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
     Full Idea: Multiple realization goes deeper and wider than biological species, and even in the same individual the neural realizer, or correlate, of a given mental state or function may change over time through maturation and brain injuries.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.095)
     A reaction: The tricky question here is what you mean by 'change'. How different must a pattern of neurons be before you say it is of a different type? How do you individuate a type?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
     Full Idea: My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.102)
     A reaction: With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
     Full Idea: It has been customary to distinguish between two broad categories of mental phenomena, the intentional and the phenomenal, without excluding those that have both (e.g. emotions).
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: This has become the conventional modern account of the mind. It seems a little too simple to say that the mind is characterised by two clearcut phenomena like this. I suspect that his picture will be modified in time.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: The claim of the state is only absolutely paramount on the supposition that in its commands and prohibitions it takes account of all the claims that arise out of human fellowship.
     From: T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882], §146), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: He rejects the idea of the general will in ordinary political activity, so it is not clear how this condition could ever be met in practice. Hideous governments just pay lip service to 'human fellowship'. How could you tell whether they believe it?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: Liberty was essential, not only as a means to equality, but as part of it. …because the opportunity which was to be equalised was not merely to have and to be happy, but to do and to realise. It was 'the right of man to make the best of himself'.
     From: T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV
     A reaction: This nicely identifies the core idea of civilised liberalism (as opposed to the crazy self-seeking kind). I think 'give people the right to make the best of themselves' makes a good slogan, because it implies ensuring that they have the means.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Political effort in all its highest forms is the expression of a belief in the reality of the social spirit as the deeper element in the individual.
     From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: Although Green is rather literally spiritual, if we express it as a central aspect of human nature, this idea strikes me as correct. Writing in 2021, I am totally bewildered by the entire absence of any 'higher' forms of political expression.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Green condemned pure communism, not in the name of any abstract rights of the individual, but of the right of the community itself to the best that individuals can contribute through the free and spontaneous exercise of their powers of self-expression.
     From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State IV
     A reaction: Interesting. In a very authoritarian communist state it does seem that citizens are less able to contribute to the general good. But extreme liberty seems also to undermine the general good. Hm.
Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: Common ownership in early societies is not the denial of a man's private property in the products of his own labour, but the only way under the circumstances of securing it.
     From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882], §218) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: This is announced with some confidence, but it is very speculative. I think there is some truth in Locke's thought that putting work into a creation creates natural ownership. But who owns the raw materials? Why is work valued highly?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: A national spirit cannot exist apart from the individuals who embody it.
     From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: We see this in football supporters. They are thrilled by the glory of a great victory, but the reality is just the thrill of the players, and the exuberance in each supporter's mind. There is no further entity called the 'glory'. Green was a liberal.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: It is not the power of forcible tenure but the power of utilisation for social ends that is the ground of the permanent recognition that constitutes a right to property.
     From: report of T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: Tell that to the aristocratic owners of British grouse moors! This just seems to be wishful thinking. Does that mean that I have no right to property if my ends are not 'social'?
Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: The rationale of property is that every one should be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping the means of realising a will which in possibility is a will directed to social good.
     From: T.H. Green (Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation [1882], §220), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State III
     A reaction: An interesting argument. If you want free citizens in a liberal society to be capable of achieving social good, you must allow them the right to acquire the means of doing so.