Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Negative Dialectics' and 'Entity and Identity'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
If philosophy could be summarised it would be pointless [Adorno]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is in essence not summarisable. Otherwise it would be superfluous; that most of it allows its to be summarised speaks against it.
     From: Theodor W. Adorno (Negative Dialectics [1966], p.34), quoted by Gerhard Richter - Benjamin and Adorno 3
     A reaction: This seems contradict the Cicero quotation which I take to be the epigraph of my collection of ideas. Adorno has a very 'continental' view, placing philosophy much closer to poetry (Heidegger's later view) than to science. Not like advocacy either.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: There is a good case for a conservative reform of the word 'object'. Objects in the 'logical' sense would be all predicate-worthy identifiabilia whatever. Objects in the 'ontological' sense would form one ontological category among many others.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I n4)
     A reaction: This ambiguity has caused me no end of confusion (and irritation!). I wish philosophers wouldn't hijack perfectly good English words and give them weird meanings. Nice to have a distinguished fellow like Strawson make this suggestion.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
     Full Idea: For no object is there a unique character or relation by which it must be identified if it is to be identified at all. This is why it makes no sense to ask, impersonally and in general, of some individual object what makes it the individual object it is.
     From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I)
     A reaction: He links this remark with the claim that there is no individual essence, but he seems to view an individual essence as indispensable to recognition or individuation of the object, which I don't see. Recognise it first, work out its essence later.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').