Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Fragmentation of Value' and 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
     A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
     A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
3284 There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
     Full Idea: To look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Fragmentation of Value [1977], p.135)
     A reaction: Depends on your level of generality. Values and virtues are general guides which should be brought to every action, with 'higher' values guiding choice of what is relevant.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').