8 ideas
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Those seeking to give their lives meaning usually envision a role in something larger than themselves, …but such a role can't confer significance unless that enterprise is itself significant. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §3) | |
A reaction: Which correctly implies that this way of finding meaning for one's life is doomed. |
23877 | Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil] |
Full Idea: The majority of human beings do not question the truth of an idea without which they would literally be unable to live. | |
From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.163) | |
A reaction: I assume that this inability grows stronger with age, as the dependence on the idea runs deeper. Hence for most people the beliefs which sustain them have a higher value than truth. Obviously we should all make love of truth our guiding idea! |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Justifications come to an end when we are content to have them end. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §3) | |
A reaction: This is the correct account, with the vital proviso that where justification comes to an end is usually a social matter. Robinson Crusoe doesn't care whether he 'knows' - he just acts on his beliefs. |
23878 | Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil] |
Full Idea: It is naïve to be astonished when we do not stick to firm resolutions. Something stimulated the resolution, but that something was not powerful enough to bring us to the point of carrying it out. Making the resolution may even have exhausted the stimulus. | |
From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.169) | |
A reaction: Socrates says it is a change of belief. Aristotle says it is a desire overcoming a belief. Weil gives a third way: that it is a fading in the strength of the original belief/desire impetus. |
23879 | In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil] |
Full Idea: If two men are in violent disagreement about good and evil, it is hard to believe that both of them are blindly subject to the opinion of the society around them. | |
From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.171) | |
A reaction: What a beautifully simple observation. Simone would have become a major figure if she had lived longer. No philosopher has ever written better prose. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
Full Idea: If life is absurd because it only lasts seventy years, wouldn't it be infinitely absurd if it lasted for eternity? And if we are absurd because we are small, would we be any less absurd if we filled the universe? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §1) |
23880 | When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil] |
Full Idea: At the time when war was a profession, fighting men had a morality whereby any act of war, in accordance with the customs of war, and contributing to victory, was legitimate and right. | |
From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.173) | |
A reaction: Note the caveat about 'customs', which were largely moral. See the discussion of killing the non-combatant prisoners in Shakespeare's 'Henry V'. |