10648
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Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
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Full Idea:
While mereology was originally offered with a nominalist viewpoint, resulting in a conception of mereology as an ontologically parsimonious alternative to set theory, there is no necessary link between analysis of parthood and nominalism.
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From:
Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)
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A reaction:
He cites Lesniewski and Leonard-and-Goodman. Do you allow something called a 'whole' into your ontology, as well as the parts? He observes that while 'wholes' can be concrete, they can also be abstract, if the parts are abstract.
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10661
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'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
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Full Idea:
The thesis known as 'composition is identity' is that identity is mereological composition; a fusion is just the parts counted loosely, but it is strictly a multitude and loosely a single thing.
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From:
Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.3)
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A reaction:
[He cites D.Baxter 1988, in Mind] It is not clear, from this simple statement, what the difference is between multitudes that are parts of a thing, and multitudes that are not. A heavy weight seems to hang on the notion of 'composed of'.
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10654
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The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
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Full Idea:
With a basic parthood relation, we can formally define various mereological predicates, such as overlap, underlap, proper part, over-crossing, under-crossing, proper overlap, and proper underlap.
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From:
Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.2)
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A reaction:
[Varzi offers some diagrams, but they need interpretation]
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10647
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Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
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Full Idea:
The word 'part' can used whether it is attached, or arbitrarily demarcated, or gerrymandered, or immaterial, or unextended, or spatial, or temporal.
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From:
Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)
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10649
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'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
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Full Idea:
It seems obvious that 'part' stands for a partial ordering, a reflexive ('everything is part of itself'), antisymmetic ('two things cannot be part of each other'), and transitive (a part of a part of a thing is part of that thing) relation.
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From:
Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
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A reaction:
I'm never clear why the reflexive bit of the relation should be taken as 'obvious', since it seems to defy normal usage and common sense. It would be absurd to say 'I'll give you part of the cake' and hand you the whole of it. See Idea 10651.
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23647
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Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
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Full Idea:
Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
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A reaction:
Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
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23646
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Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
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Full Idea:
An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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