22 ideas
23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
Full Idea: Power is a thing so much of its own kind, and so simple in its nature, as to admit of no logical definition. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 1) | |
A reaction: True. And this makes Powers ideally suited for the role of primitives in a metaphysics of nature. |
23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
Full Idea: Those philosophers who attribute to matter the power of gravitation, and other active powers, teach us, at the same time, that matter is a substance altogether inert, and merely passive; …that those powers are impressed on it by some external cause. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 6) | |
A reaction: This shows the dilemma of the period, when 'laws of nature' were imposed on passive matter by God, and yet gravity and magnetism appeared as inherent properties of matter. |
23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
Full Idea: It is evident that a power is a quality, and cannot exist without a subject to which it belongs. That power may exist without any being or subject to which that power may be attributed, is an absurdity, shocking to every man of common understanding. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 1) | |
A reaction: This is understandble in the 18th C, when free-floating powers were inconceivable, but now that we have fields and plasmas and whatnot, we can't rule out pure powers as basic. However, I incline to agree with Reid. Matter is active. |
23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
Full Idea: Consciousness is that power of the mind by which it has an immediate knowledge of its own operations. …Every operation of the mind is the exertion of some power of the mind. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 1) | |
A reaction: I strongly favour this account of the mind and consciousness in terms of powers, because they give the best basis for their dynamic nature, and seem to be primitives which terminate all of our explanations. Science identifies the powers for us. |
23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
Full Idea: Every man is led by nature to attribute to himself the free determination of his own will, and to believe those events to be in his power which depend upon his will. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: I'm happy to say we are all responsible for those actions which are caused by the conscious decisions of our own will (our mental decision mechanisms), but personally I would drop the word 'free', which adds nothing. We are not 'ultimately' responsible. |
20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Thomas Reid said that an agent's causing something involves a fundamentally different kind of causation from inanimate causing. | |
From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788]) by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent' | |
A reaction: I'm afraid the great philosopher of common sense got it wrong on this one. Introducing a new type of causation into our account of nature is crazy. |
23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
Full Idea: There is a reality outside the world …outside any sphere that is accessible to human faculties. Corresponding to this reality, at the centre of the human heart, is the longing for an absolute good, which is always there and never appeased by this world. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.221) | |
A reaction: I don't believe in any sort of transcendent reality, but I can identify with this. Even if you have a highly naturalistic view of what is valuable (see late Philippa Foot), there is this indeterminate yearning for that value. |
23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
Full Idea: Any place where the needs of human beings are satisfied can be recognised by the fact that there is a flowering of fraternity, joy, beauty, and happiness. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.230) | |
A reaction: Weil writes a lengthy analysis of what she sees as the basic human needs, beyond the obvious food, water etc. An excellent place to start a line of political thought. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to feel equal respect for things that are in fact unequal unless the respect is given to something that is identical in all of them. Men are all unequal in all their relations with things of this world. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.223) | |
A reaction: Weil votes for some link to transcendence in each of us, but I would prefer some more naturalistic proposal for what we all have in common. There are plenty of aspects which unite all human beings, which grounds this unconditional respect. |
23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
Full Idea: The boredom produced by a complete absence of risk is a sickness of the human soul. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: An unusual analysis of boredom. I think it is probably purposeful activity that we need, rather than actual risk, with all the stresses that involves. Risks are justified by their rewards. |
23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of disciplined participation in a common task of public value, and it has need of personal initiative within this participation. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: The intrusion of competitive capitalism into almost every area of modern life has more or less eliminated such activities. Only state employees now have such satisfactions, on the whole. I admire Weil's approach here. |
23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of equality and of hierarchy. Equality is the public recognition …of the principal that an equal degree of attention is due to the needs of all human beings. Hierarchy is the scale of responsibilities. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: This is the conservative aspect of Weil's largely radical political thinking. Presumably what we respect in these people is their responsibilies, and not their mere rank. Idle members of the British House of Lords have no rank in this hierarchy. |
23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
Full Idea: Every avoidable material falsehood publicly asserted should become a punishable offence. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: Yes please! The early 21st century has become the time when truth lost all value in public life. Lying to the House of Commons in the UK required instant resignation 50 years ago. Now it is just a source of laughter. No freedom to lie! |
23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
Full Idea: Liberty is the power of choice within the latitude left between the direct constraint of natural forces and the authority accepted as legitimate. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.228) | |
A reaction: Accepting legitimate authority is a nicely softened version of the social contract. We often find that the office and rank are accepted as legitimate, but then are unable to accept the appalling individual who holds the office. |
23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul has need of both personal property and collective property. …The existence of a social class defined by the lack of personal and collective property is as shameful as slavery. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: Nice. Particularly the idea that we all need collective property, such as parks and beaches and public buildings. |
23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
Full Idea: The human soul needs punishment and honour. A committer of crime has become exiled from good, and needs to be reintegrated with it through suffering. This aims to bring the soul to recognise freely some day that is infliction was just. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.229) | |
A reaction: The Scanlon contractualist approach to punishment - that the victim of it accepts its justice. Given her saintly character, Simone had a very tough view of this issue. |
8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
Full Idea: A famous example of Thomas Reid: day regularly follows night, and night regularly follows day. There is therefore a constant conjunction between night and day. But day does not cause night, nor does night cause day. | |
From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.2.2 | |
A reaction: Not a fatal objection to Hume, of course, because in the complex real world there are huge numbers of nested constant conjunctions. Night and the rotation of the Earth are conjoined. But how do you tell which constant conjunctions are causal? |
23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
Full Idea: A train of events following one another ever so regularly, could never lead us to the notion of a cause, if we had not, from our constitution, a conviction of the necessity of a cause for every event. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 5) | |
A reaction: Presumably a theist like Reid must assume that the actions of God are freely chosen, rather than necessities. It's hard to see why this principle should be innate in us, and hard to see why it must thereby be true. A bit Kantian, this idea. |
23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
Full Idea: A Newtonian philosopher …confesses his ignorance of the true cause of magnetic motion, and thinks that his business, as a philosopher, is only to find from experiment the laws by which it is regulated in all cases. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 6) | |
A reaction: Since there is a 'true cause', that implies that the laws don't actively 'regulate' the magnetism, but only describe its regularity, which I think is the correct view of laws. |
23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature are the rules according to which the effects are produced; but there must be a cause which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never navigated a ship. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power [1788], 6) | |
A reaction: Very nice. No enquirer should be satisfied with merely discovering patterns; the point is to explain the patterns. |
23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |
Full Idea: Anyone whose attention and love are directed towards the reality outside the world recognises that he is bound by the permanent obligation to remedy …all the privations of soul and body which are liable to destroy or damage any human being whatsoever. | |
From: Simone Weil (Draft Statement of Human Obligations [1943], p.225) | |
A reaction: [abridged] An interesting attempt to articulate the religious motivation of morality. The Euthyphro question remains - of why this vision of a wholly good higher morality should motivate anyone, unless they already possess a desire for that good. |