Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Reflections on my Critics' and 'De ente praedicamentali'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
     Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5)
     A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
     Full Idea: It is clear from the way in which one must speak about time and other successive entities that talk about 'the present' must be enlarged. Otherwise it would have to be denied that any successive entity could exist, which is impossible.
     From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: This is a lovely idea, even if it is not quite clear what it means. The mind seems to stretch out the now anyway (as the 'specious present'), so why not embrace that in language and conscious thought?
To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
     Full Idea: If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.
     From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
     Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness.
     From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8
     A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
     Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6)
     A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').