67 ideas
| 16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I suppose so. Physics only works at one level of description. Metaphysics often works with concepts which only emerge at a more general level than physics. There are also many metaphysical problems which are of no interest to most physicists. |
| 16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Kantian strain survives in the notion that metaphysics is not about the world, but about our 'conceptual system', especially as what structures our thought about the world. This keeps it a priori, and so not about the world itself. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: Strawson would embody this view, I suppose. I take our conceptual system to be largely a reflection of (and even creation of) the world, and not just an arbitrary conventional attempt to grasp the world. Analysing concepts partly analyses the world. |
| 16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If metaphysical possibility extends more widely than physical possibility, this may make metaphysics out to be nothing but the analysis of fantastical descriptions produced by philosophers. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin wants metaphysics to be firmly constrained in its possibilities by what scientific undestanding permits, and he is right. Metaphysics must integrate into science, or wither away on the margins. |
| 16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If the universe has been profligate, then Ockham's Razor will lead us astray. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: That is, there may be a vast number of entities which exist beyond what seems to be 'necessary'. |
| 16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Razor is good when it councils higher credence to explanations which posit a single cause to multiple events that occur in a striking pattern, over explanations involving coincidental multiple causes. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: This is in the context of Maudlin warning against embracing the Razor too strongly. Presumably inductive success suggests that the world supports this particular use of the Razor. |
| 3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.205) | |
| A reaction: This may just be a reasonable application of Ockham's Razor, but I fear that Berkeley painted himself into corner by demanding too many 'reasons' for everything. |
| 3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: I know that nothing inconsistent can exist. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.224) | |
| A reaction: Fine, but the problem is to assess with confidence what is inconsistent. Human imagination seems to be the test for existence. But what else can we do? |
| 16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Humean project is unjustified, in that both the laws of nature and the direction of time require no analysis, and is misconceived, in that the atoms it employs do not correspond to present physical ontology. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I certainly find it strange, or excessively empirical, that Lewis thinks our account of reality should rest on 'qualities'. Maudlin's whole books is an implicit attack on David Lewis. |
| 16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: At base it is not merely, as Lewis says, that everything else supervenes on the Mosaic; but rather that anything that exists at all is just a feature or element or generic property of the Mosaic. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: [Maudlin has just quoted Idea 16210] Correct about Lewis, but Lewis just has a normal view of supervenience. Only 'emergentists' would think the supervenience allowed anything more, and they are deeply misguided, and in need of help. |
| 16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The Humean Mosaic appears to admit of no further explanation. Since it is the ontological bedrock, …none of the further things can account for the structure of the Mosaic itself. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: A very nice point, reminiscent of Popper's objection to essentialism, that he thought it blocked further enquiry, when actually further enquiry was possible. Lewis and Hume seem too mesmerised by epistemology. They need best explanation. |
| 16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The 'spinning disc' is not metaphysically possible. We have every reason to believe that there is no such thing as 'perfectly homogeneous matter'. The atomic theory of matter is as well established as any scientific theory is likely to be. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
| A reaction: This is a key case for Maudlin, and his contempt for metaphysics which is not scientifically informed. I agree with him. Extreme thought experiments are worth considering, but impossible ones are pointless. |
| 16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of ontological commitment becomes a central element in a theory of ontology if one merely adds that a particular theory is, in fact, true | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Helpful. I don't think the truth of a theory entails the actual existence of every component mentioned in the theory, as some of them may be generalisations, abstractions, vague, or even convenient linking fictions. |
| 16259 | Naďve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Naďve translation from natural language into formal language can obscure necessary ontology as easily as it can create superfluous ontological commitment. …The lion's share of metaphysical work is done when settling on the right translation. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect this is more than a mere problem of 'naivety', but may be endemic to the whole enterprise. If you hammer a square peg into a round hole, you expect to lose something. Language is subtle, logic is crude. |
| 16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Fragility is not a fundamental physical property, in that two pieces of glass cannot be physically identical save for their fragility. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: Nice. The best idea I have found in Maudlin, so far! This gives a very nice test for picking out the fundamental physical and intrinsic properties. |
| 16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If one believes that fundamental physics is the place to look for the truths about universals (or tropes or natural sets), then one may find that physics is telling us there are no such things. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: His prior discussion of quantum chromodynamics suggests, to me, merely that properties can be described in terms of vectors etc., and remains neutral on the ontology - but then I am blinded by science. |
| 16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: On one line of thought, the question of whether universals exist seems to reduce to the question of the utility, or necessity, of using second-order rather than first-order logic. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Second-order logic quantifies over properties, where first-order logic just quantifies over objects. This is an extreme example of doing your metaphysics largely through logic. Not my approach. |
| 3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.257) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of idealism. Why is he so confident of making this assertion. Note the addition, though, of 'in a strict' sense. He is presenting an epistemological claim as if it was an ontological one. |
| 16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: While logical impossibility is a species of metaphysical impossibility, logical possibility is not a species of metaphysical possibility. The logically impeccable description 'Cicero was not Tully' describes a metaphysically impossible situation. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 7 Epilogue) | |
| A reaction: The context of this is Maudlin attack on daft notions of metaphysical possibility that are at variance with the limits set by science, but he is still conceding that there are types of metaphysical modality. |
| 3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: A thing is shown to be impossible when a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.214) | |
| A reaction: The problem is always that imagination is needed to see the 'repugnancy', and that is relative and limited. |
| 16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The purpose of the antecedent of a counterfactual is to provide instructions on how to pick a Cauchy surface (pick a moment in time) and how to generate an altered description of that moment. It is more of a command than an indicative sentence. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Quite plausible, but the antecedent might contain no description. 'If things had gone differently, we wouldn't be in this mess'. The antecedent might be timeless. 'If pigs had wings, they still wouldn't fly'. |
| 3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: As our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows that they cannot all be true copies of them. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.239) | |
| A reaction: This seems a good objection to any direct or naďve realist view. Colours get darker as the sun goes down, and objects become blurred as they recede into the distance. |
| 3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Either you perceive the being of matter immediately, or mediately; if immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it; if mediately, let me know by what reasonings it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.208) | |
| A reaction: A problem for strong empiricists, and he is right that existence can't be directly perceived, but it seems a good explanation (for which some reason can be shown), and supports a more rationalist view. |
| 3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Sensible things are nothing else but so many sensible qualities. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.154) | |
| A reaction: As it stands this is phenomenalism, but Berkeley eventually votes for idealism. He should acknowledge possible sensations which aren't actually experienced. |
| 5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Berkeley did not (as we are commonly told) deny the reality of material things. ..What Berkeley discovered was that material things must be defined in terms of sense-contents. | |
| From: report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather debatable attempt to claim that Berkeley was a phenomenalist (like Ayer), rather than an idealist. Try ideas 3942, 3944, 3945, 3957, 3959 in this database. |
| 5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: The considerations which make it necessary, as Berkeley saw, to give a phenomenalist account of material things, make it necessary also, as Berkeley did not see, to give a phenomenalist account of the self. | |
| From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.7 | |
| A reaction: Phenomenalism involves 'possible' experiences as well as actual ones. That could add up to quite a rich and stable account of the self, as opposed to Hume's notorious introspection, which only saw an actual shifting 'bundle' of experience. |
| 1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Berkeley thinks 'to be is to be perceived', and only God provides continuity. He has simply confused the experience of perception with the thing being perceived. Ideas have content. | |
| From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy |
| 6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Berkeley's thesis is that reality ultimately consists of a community of minds and their ideas; one of the minds (God) is infinite, and causes most of the ideas. | |
| From: report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: I think Russell nicely pinpoints what is wrong with Berekely, which is that he confuses ideas with their contents. If I think about my garden, the garden is real (probably), which is the content, and they idea is just a way of thinking. |
| 3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.172) | |
| A reaction: But we distinguish between subjective time (which flies when you are having fun), and objective time, judged from observation of clocks and nature. |
| 3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: That there is no such thing as what philosophers call 'material substance', I am seriously persuaded. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.150) | |
| A reaction: I'm sorry, but I can't do with this. It confuses epistemology with ontology. Ontology is a matter of judgement; epistemology is the evidence on which we base it. We know sensations; personally I judge that there are material substances. What about you? |
| 3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: I may conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive it existing out of the minds of all spirits. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.184) | |
| A reaction: If Berkeley has based a world view on this point, then his mistake is to require a 'proof'. Aristotle explained why you can't prove everything (not to mention Gödel). |
| 3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: I challenge you to show me that thing in nature which needs matter to explain or account for it. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.212) | |
| A reaction: I disagree. Physics is a good theory for explaining why we have perceptions. Failing that there is not even a glimmer of an explanation of our experiences. |
| 3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Wood, fire, water, flesh, iron, are things that I know, and only known because I perceive them by my senses; these are immediately perceived, and so are ideas; ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence consists therefore in being perceived. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220) | |
| A reaction: This makes no distinction between an idea and its content. Berkeley fails to grasp the weird concept of intentionality. Trees aren't in my head, just because I think about them! |
| 3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into primary and secondary; the former are extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion and rest, which exist really in bodies. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.169) | |
| A reaction: A crucial distinction, which anti-realists such as Berkeley end up denying. I think it is a good distinction, and philosophers should fight to preserve it. |
| 3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: A mite must be supposed to see his own foot as a body of some considerable dimension, though they appear to you scarcely discernible. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.170) | |
| A reaction: Berkeley is confused. Hot is secondary, but temperature is primary. Bigness is secondary, size primay. Midgets and tall people don't disagree over the size of a table. |
| 3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: As we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another; doth it not follow that it is not really inherent in the object? | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.171) | |
| A reaction: Berkeley is confused, because he is too literally empirical. Qualities are not self-evidently primary or secondary, but are judged so after comparisons (e.g. with testimony, or with the other senses). |
| 3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: By 'solidity' either you do not mean any sensible quality, and so it is beside our enquiry; or if you do, it must be hardness or resistance, which are plainly relative to our senses. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.173) | |
| A reaction: Berkeley fails to recognise that a quality can have primary and secondary aspects (hot/high temperature). He is right that primary qualities are not directly perceived. They are judgements. |
| 3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.186) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, if secondary qualities are not strictly perceptions of the object, and primary qualities are not directly perceived, then we don't seem to perceive anything at all. Perhaps we should drop the concept of 'perception'? |
| 3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.237) | |
| A reaction: If that is a judgement, which it seems to be, it is a strange one. Realists offer a much better explanation of perceptions. |
| 3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: The difference between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream, is that the latter are faint and indistinct. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.225) | |
| A reaction: In Hume this becomes 'impressions' and 'ideas'. It does raise the question of WHY some ideas are not as faint as others. |
| 3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Figures and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.176) | |
| A reaction: Is the square root of 169 less 'pure' in my mind if I learn it from laying out bricks instead of by thinking about numbers? Confusion of how you learn with what you learn? |
| 3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: We might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no matter in the world. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.209) | |
| A reaction: An old Greek argument. Now we have an explanation of experience, but we wouldn't if nothing existed. Which doesn't prove that anything exists. Is some explanation always preferable to none? Cf. religion. |
| 3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other? | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.158) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear example of how some relativism must be acknowledged. It feels hot, but what is its temperature in degrees C? |
| 16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Induction is always a leap beyond the known, but we are constantly assured by later experience that we have landed safely. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: Not philosophically very interesting, but a nice remark for capturing the lived aspect of inductive thought, as practised by the humblest of animals. |
| 16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: A law ought to be capable of playing some role in explaining the phenomena that are governed by or are manifestations of it. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: I find this attitude bewildering. 'Why do electrons have spin?' 'Because they all do!' The word 'governed' is the clue. What on earth is a law, if it can 'govern' nature? What is its ontological status? Natures of things are basic, not 'laws'. |
| 3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: It is plain that other minds have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220) | |
| A reaction: This is a surprising claim from Berkeley. If trees only exist through their experience in my mind, why don't other minds exist in the same way? |
| 3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.203) | |
| A reaction: Presumably, though, he thinks that thought can cause 'that which is unthinking' to move'. He likes one half of the interaction problem (which supports dualism), but avoids the other half. |
| 5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Berkeley seems to have confused the colour of the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension; probably either of these would have been called an 'idea' be Berkeley. | |
| From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy | |
| A reaction: If we are saying that Berkeley's error was entirely verbal, there is a chicken-and-egg problem. He was an idealist, so he wouldn't have thought that there were two separate concepts behind the word 'idea'. Russell merely asserts that there are. |
| 3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.227) | |
| A reaction: A Kantian view (that the only good thing is a good will). It is a very empiricist (and anti-Greek) view to deny that actions have any intrinsic value. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The evaluation of counterfactual claims is widely recognised as being influenced by context and interest. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Such evaluation certainly seems to involve imagination, and so the pragmatics can creep in there. I don't quite see why it should be deeply contextual. |
| 16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: It seems unlikely the psychological process could mirror Lewis's semantics: people don't imagine a multiplicity of worlds and the pick out the most similar. Rather we construct representations of possible worlds from counterfactual descriptions. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: I approve of fitting such theories into a psychology, but this may be unfair to Lewis, who aims for a logical model, not an account of how we actually approach the problem. |
| 16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: A counterexample to the counterfactual approach is that perhaps the effect would have occurred despite the absence of the cause since another cause would have stepped in to bring it about. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
| A reaction: …Hence you cannot say 'if C had not occurred, E would definitely not have occurred'. You have to add 'ceteris paribus', which ruins the neatness of the theory. |
| 16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: When we think we know the cause of an event, we typically assent to the corresponding Hume counterfactual. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is the correct grounding of the counterfactual approach - not that we think counterfactuals are causation, but that knowledge of causation will map neatly onto a network of counterfactuals, thus providing a logic for the whole process. |
| 16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: If Kennedy had still been President in Dec 1963, he would not have been assassinated in Nov 1963, so the counterfactual goes both ways (where the cause seems to only go one way). | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin says a lot of fine-tuning has sort of addressed these problems, but that counterfactual causation is basically wrong-headed anyway, and I incline to agree, though one must understand what the theory is (and is not) trying to do. |
| 16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Laws are ontologically primitives at least in that two worlds could differ in their laws but not in any observable respect. ….[21] I take content of the laws to be expressed by equations. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: At least that spells out his view fairly dramatically, but I am baffled as to what he thinks a law could be. He is arguing against the Lewis regularity-axioms view, and the Armstrong universal-relations view. He ignores the essentialist view. |
| 16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental laws of nature appear to be laws of temporal evolution: they specify how the state of the universe will, or might, evolve from a given intial state. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin takes both laws of nature and the passage of time to be primitive facts, and this is how they are connected. I think (this week) that I take time and causation to be primitive, but not laws. |
| 16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The laws of nature stand in no need of 'philosophical analysis'; they ought to be posited as ontological bedrock. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is Maudlin's most basic principle, and I don't agree with it. The notion that laws are more deeply embedded in reality than the physical stuff they control is a sort of 'law-mysticism' that needs to be challenged. |
| 16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: 'All humans who live in houses with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law because the class referred to is not a natural kind. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin wants laws to be primitive, but he now needs a primitive notion of a natural kind to make it work. If kinds generate laws, you can ditch the laws, and build your theory on the kinds. He also says no death is explained by 'all humans are mortal'. |
| 16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: On the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, I take it that if the world is extensive and variegated enough, then there must be laws. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. If there is any sort of pattern discernible in the surface waves on the sea, then there must be a law to cover it, not matter how vague or complex. |
| 16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: I believe that it is a fundamental, irreducible fact about the spatio-temporal structure of the world that time passes. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4) | |
| A reaction: Worth quoting because it comes from a philosopher fully informed about, and heavily committed to, the physicist's approach to reality. One fears that physicists steeped in Einstein are all B-series Eternalists. Get a life! |
| 16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary and, I suppose, a priori that if time passes at all it passes at one second per second. …Similarly, the fair exchange rate for a dollar must be a dollar. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: [He is discussing Huw Price on time] This is a reply to the claim that if time passes it has to pass at some rate, and 'one second per second' is ridiculous. Not very convincing, even with the dollar analogy. |
| 16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Given events ordered in a B series, one defines an infinitude of different A series that correspond to taking different events as 'now' or 'present'. McTaggart talks of 'the A series' when there is an infinitude of such. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 4.3 n11) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather mathematical (and distorted) claim about the A series view. The A-series is one dynamic happening. Not an infinity of static times lines, each focused on a different 'now'. |
| 3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: I immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.198) | |
| A reaction: Daft. This contradicts Berkeley's whole empiricist position, that existence depends on known experience. Who knows whether God is thinking about trees? |
| 3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: From the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do by an act of reason necessarily infer the existence of a God. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.222) | |
| A reaction: No. Hume answered this, by showing how big abstract ideas are built up from experience. This is a future bishop's wish-fulfilment. |
| 3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Divines and philosophers have proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of creation, that it was the workmanship of God. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.198) | |
| A reaction: Not convincing. Beauty is probably a sublimation of sexual desire (or an echo of the human mind in the external world, in music), and utility is relative to homo sapiens, I presume. |
| 3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: Thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, have the use of limited powers, ultimately derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their own actions. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.228) | |
| A reaction: An episcopal evasion. A classic attempt to have cake and eat it. Either God is in charge or he isn't. |
| 3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |
| Full Idea: If sin doth not consist of purely physical actions, the making God a cause of all such actions, is not making him the author of sin. | |
| From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.227) | |
| A reaction: An equivocation. If responsibility resides in consciousness, God is presumably conscious, and we can judge the events he causes. |