Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Conceptions of Consequence' and 'True Believers'

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3 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Aristotle's proofs give understanding, so it can't be otherwise, so consequence is necessary [Smiley, by Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The ingredient of necessity [in Aristotle's account of consequence] is required by his demand that proof should produce 'understanding' [episteme], coupled with his claim that understanding something involves seeing that it cannot be otherwise.
     From: report of Timothy Smiley (Conceptions of Consequence [1998], p.599) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2
     A reaction: An intriguing reverse of the normal order. Not 'necessity in logic delivers understanding', but 'reaching understanding shows the logic was necessary'.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte]
     Full Idea: Dennett maintains that a system has states with representational content if we are able to predict its behaviour reliably and voluminously by adopting the intentional stance toward it.
     From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (True Believers [1981]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 5
     A reaction: Dennett himself seems happy to thereby attribute representational content to a chess-playing computer. This sounds like a test for content, rather than explaining what it is. Not promising, I think.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').