Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Causal Connections' and 'Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude'

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3 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
     Full Idea: Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
     From: Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
     A reaction: If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation.
     From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2
     A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'.