12 ideas
10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A logic is a collection of closely related artificial languages, and its older meaning is the study of the rules of sound argument. The languages can be used as a framework for studying rules of argument. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Hodges then says he will stick to the languages] The suspicion is that one might confine the subject to the artificial languages simply because it is easier, and avoids the tricky philosophical questions. That approximates to computer programming. |
10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: To have a truth-value, a first-order formula needs an 'interpretation' (I) of its constants, and a 'valuation' (ν) of its variables. Something in the world is attached to the constants; objects are attached to variables. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) |
10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Semantic rules can be presented in 'Tarski style', where the interpretation-plus-valuation is reduced to the same question for simpler formulas, or the 'Henkin-Hintikka style' in terms of games, or the 'Barwise-Etchemendy style' for computers. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) | |
A reaction: I haven't yet got the hang of the latter two, but I note them to map the territory. |
10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.5) | |
A reaction: [There should be no space between the vertical and the two horizontals!] This contrasts with |-, which means 'is proved in'. That is a syntactic or proof-theoretic symbol, whereas |= is a semantic symbol (involving truth). |
10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem (the weakest form): If L is a first-order language with at most countably many formulas, and T is a consistent theory in L. Then T has a model with at most countably many elements. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: every first-order theory with infinite models has arbitrarily large models. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Compactness Theorem: suppose T is a first-order theory, ψ is a first-order sentence, and T entails ψ. Then there is a finite subset U of T such that U entails ψ. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) | |
A reaction: If entailment is possible, it can be done finitely. |
10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.6) |
14365 | Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens] |
Full Idea: I defend what I call the 'simple view', that scientific understanding is that state produced, and only produced, by grasping a correct explanation. | |
From: Michael Strevens (No Understanding without Explanation [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: I like this because it clearly states what I take to be the view of Aristotle, and the key to understanding the whole of that philosopher's system. I take the view to be correct. |
14368 | We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens] |
Full Idea: 'Understanding why' is quite separate from 'understanding that': you might be exquisitely, incandescently aware of the cat's being on the mat without having the slightest clue how it got there. My topic is understanding why. | |
From: Michael Strevens (No Understanding without Explanation [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: Can't we separate 'understand how' from 'understand why'? I may know that someone dropped a cat through my letterbox, but more understanding would still be required. (He later adds understanding 'with' a theory). |
14369 | Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens] |
Full Idea: Objectors to the idea that understanding requires explanation say that understanding is a precondition for explanation, that understanding comes in degrees, that understanding is active, and that it is holistic - all unlike explanations. | |
From: Michael Strevens (No Understanding without Explanation [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: He works through these four objections and replies to them, in defence of the thesis in Idea 14365. I agree with Strevens on this. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |