7 ideas
14365 | Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens] |
Full Idea: I defend what I call the 'simple view', that scientific understanding is that state produced, and only produced, by grasping a correct explanation. | |
From: Michael Strevens (No Understanding without Explanation [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: I like this because it clearly states what I take to be the view of Aristotle, and the key to understanding the whole of that philosopher's system. I take the view to be correct. |
14368 | We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens] |
Full Idea: 'Understanding why' is quite separate from 'understanding that': you might be exquisitely, incandescently aware of the cat's being on the mat without having the slightest clue how it got there. My topic is understanding why. | |
From: Michael Strevens (No Understanding without Explanation [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: Can't we separate 'understand how' from 'understand why'? I may know that someone dropped a cat through my letterbox, but more understanding would still be required. (He later adds understanding 'with' a theory). |
14369 | Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens] |
Full Idea: Objectors to the idea that understanding requires explanation say that understanding is a precondition for explanation, that understanding comes in degrees, that understanding is active, and that it is holistic - all unlike explanations. | |
From: Michael Strevens (No Understanding without Explanation [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: He works through these four objections and replies to them, in defence of the thesis in Idea 14365. I agree with Strevens on this. |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |
A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |