5 ideas
| 15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement. | |
| From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1 | |
| A reaction: This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps. |
| 14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any 'truth') to its being the predestined result to which sufficient enquiry would ultimately lead. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.288) |
| 14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Pragmatism is no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine the truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.271) | |
| A reaction: Suddenly I recognise a prominent strand of modern philosophy of language (especially in America) for what it is. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: It is alleged that liberals fail to recognise that people are naturally social or communal. …But liberals believe that people form and join social relations in which they come to understand and pursue the good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality [1989], Conc) | |
| A reaction: This is particulary aimed at communitarians, who see liberalism as based on a distorted concept of people as isolated beings. Personally I am beginning to shift my views from Aristotelian communitarianism to modern liberalism, so I like this idea. |