18 ideas
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I argue for the direct identification of the secondary qualities with microscopic primary qualities of physical things. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xxii) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit like the eliminativism which Armstrong rejects. This seems in danger of mixing questions about the nature of mental events with questions about the nature of externally perceived objects. |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Consciousness and experience of qualities are often run together - a serious mistake, I think. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvii) | |
A reaction: A difficult claim to evaluate. Can we experience redness without being conscious of it? Could there be consciousness (e.g. of concepts) which didn't involve any qualities? I suspect that qualities are more basic than intentionality or consciousness. |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Behaviourism is false, but one is not far from the truth if one defines the mind as the cause of behaviour. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: As Putnam says, if you cut all the efferent (outgoing) nerves, you would have a mind with no behaviour at all. I would say my mind is full of stuff that never affects my behaviour. However, influencing behaviour is certainly the main function of a mind. |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The manifestations of a disposition have the particularly mysterious property (metaphysically speaking) that they need not exist - which makes them rather like intentional objects. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvii) | |
A reaction: His example is a brittle glass which never shatters. This problem seems to require the mention of conditional and counterfactual statements in the description of the actual world, which rather increases the workload for philosophers. |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I speak of my view as the Causal version of functionalism, which asserts that mental states are states apt for the production of certain ranges of behaviour and, in some cases, apt for being produced by certain ranges of stimuli. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv) | |
A reaction: This effectively makes a mental state a place in a flowdiagram (and hence the mind is software). It says nothing about what qualities the mental states have which make them apt for this role. Full explanations need more than the function. |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I now think, following Lycan, that my Causal theory of mentality would be strengthened (perhaps eliminating some potential counter-examples) by the addition of a teleological element. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xviii) | |
A reaction: For Lycan, see Idea 6533. Armstrong has begun to realise that merely specifying the causal role of a mental state is too thin as an explanation. Teleology widens the notion of function. I also want to know about the properties that make it possible. |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Granted the contingency of the laws of nature, the identification of dispositions with their categorical bases can be contingent only. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvi) | |
A reaction: Personally I am not willing to grant the contingency of the laws of nature, but I suppose Armstrong is right about identity if he is right about laws. Presumably an identity could happen to be invariant across possible worlds, without being necessary. |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: If the mental is just that which plays a causal role then there is the possibility, which may even be an empirical possibility, that the causal role of tokens of the same mental type should be filled by tokens of significantly different physical types. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv) | |
A reaction: This allows for multiple realisability in a physicalist framework. Fear has the same role in all animals, but may be realised in physically different ways. I go further, and say that two mental states could differ, while playing the same role. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: For liberals the basis of state legitimacy is a shared sense of justice, not a shared conception of the good. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'legitimacy') | |
A reaction: For a liberal state to work, the citizens have to roughly believe in the core values of liberalism, which are primarily freedom and equality (and hence justice). |
23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: According to liberal theory, a state which intervenes in the cultural market place to encourage any particular way of life restricts people's autonomy. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'social') | |
A reaction: The communitarian idea is that the state should intervene, in order to foster the best aspects of communal culture. The dangers are obvious, and can be seen in any totalitarian state. A gentle hand on the tiller, perhaps? Increase the options? |
23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Most contemporary liberal philosophers have little to say about the ideal of community. …It is often seen as derivative of liberty and equality - a society lives up to the ideal of community if its members are treated as free and equal persons. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: He cites Rawls as an example. This is the central idea which was attacked by modern communitarians. A collection of scattered self-seeking isolated individuals doesn't seem to amount to a healthy communal life. Maybe community needs further rights? |
23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: In recent centuries the ideal of community has taken many forms, from class solidarity or shared citizenship to a common ethnic descent or cultural identity. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Language and religion are not explicitly mentioned, but must be implied. Supporting a major sports team is also worth mentioning. |
23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The problem of the exclusion of historically marginalised groups is endemic to the communitarian project. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'legitimacy') | |
A reaction: Put simply, old-fashioned styles of community are probably impossible in large modern states, some with rather arbitrary borders. |
23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians say that some of our social roles must be regarded as fixed when planning our lives, …but the women's movement has shown how deeply entrenched social roles can be questioned and rejected. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Embedded') | |
A reaction: True, but parents walking out on young children also shows that. The ideal must be some sort of balance. |
23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians rarely distinguish between collective activities and political activities. Shared participation aids intelligent decisions about the good life, but why should that be organised through the state, rather than by free individuals? | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'need') | |
A reaction: Kylicka points out later that local groups can be very unintelligent or prejudiced. Modern media have changed that picture, because participation can be with geographically remote people. |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians believe either that community replaces the need for principles of justice, or that the community is either the source of such principles or should play a greater role in deciding their content. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] The idea that a racist or chauvinist or puritanical or insular community should decide justice for all its members sounds horrible. It drives you to liberal individualism, just thinking about it. |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Justice can help mediate conflicts, but it also tends to creat conflicts, and to decrease the natural expression of sociability. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'limits') | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Michael Sandel on liberalism] Family life might not go well if all of its members continually demanded justice for themselves as individuals. Maybe our concept of justice is too individualistic? Do we need a sense of 'group' justice? |