Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Mathematical Logic (revised)' and 'Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
     Full Idea: A 'quasi-quotation' [corner quotes, Quine quotes] designates that (unspecified) expression which is obtained from the contents of the corners by replacing the Greek letters by the (unspecified) expressions which they designate.
     From: Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940], 1.6)
     A reaction: Filed under 'variables', as they seem to be variables that can refer to actual expressions, like algebra. Quine was determined to distinguish clearly between 'mention' and 'use'. 'Half-hearted substitutional quantification', says Fine.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
     Full Idea: Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6
     A reaction: Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
     Full Idea: For Peirce there are three different kinds of sign, which are different kinds of representation, built on different relationships: an 'icon' represents what it resembles, an 'index' is a natural sign, and a 'symbol' is a conventional sign.
     From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs [1897]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.4
     A reaction: Maund makes use of natural signs (like footprints) to explain representative perception. Peirce's distinctions seem useful in philosophy of mind generally, if the brain somehow represents what it experiences. How subjective are signs?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').