10 ideas
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I believe the general form of moral reasoning is to put yourself in other people's shoes. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §9) |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
Full Idea: What makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life prospects put them at the bottom. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Egalitarianism was once opposed to aristocratic values, but now it is opposed by adherents of two non-aristocratic values: utility (increase benefit, even if unequally) and individual rights (which redistribution violates). | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §8) |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In assessing equality of claims, it must be decided whether to use a single, objective standard, or whether interests should be ranked by the person's own estimation. Also should they balance momentary or long-term needs? | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §6) |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The communitarian defence of equality says it is good for society as a whole, whereas the individualistic defence defends equality as a correct distributive principle. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §2) |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Contemporary political debate recognises four types of equality: political, social, legal and economic. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §1) | |
A reaction: Meaning equality of 1) power and influence, 2) status and respect, 3) rights and justice, 4) wealth. |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The morality of rights tends to be a limited, even minimal, morality. It leaves a great deal of human life ungoverned by moral restrictions or requirements. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality [1977], §5) |
16697 | Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Suppose God annihilates everything, and then creates something new. The vacant interval could last a shorter or longer time, so there are facts about time independent of facts about motion. | |
From: report of William Crathorn (Sentences [1335], I.16, concl.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2 | |
A reaction: Not very persuasive if God is in some way 'timeless'. Crathorn would have loved Shoemaker's argument, where motionless time is the best explanation, rather than a possible explanation. |