Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'What is an Emotion?' and 'Mind and World'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
8251 The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell]
     Full Idea: The logical space of reasons is just part of the logical space of nature. ...And, in a Kantian slogan, the space of reasons is the realm of freedom.
     From: John McDowell (Mind and World [1994], Intro 7)
     A reaction: [second half on p.5] This is a modern have-your-cake-and-eat-it view of which I am becoming very suspicious. The modern Kantians (Davidson, Nagel, McDowell) are struggling to naturalise free will, but it won't work. Just dump it!
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
8128 Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
     Full Idea: McDowell has claimed that one cannot make sense of representation that plays a role in epistemology unless one takes the representation to be propositional, and thus capable of yielding reasons.
     From: report of John McDowell (Mind and World [1994]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.456
     A reaction: A transcendental argument leads back to a somewhat implausible conclusion. I suspect that McDowell has a slightly inflated (Kantian) notion of the purity of the 'space of reasons'. Do philosophers just imagine their problems?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
19092 There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth]
     Full Idea: McDowell argues that the Myth of the Given shows not that there is no content to a concept that is not a matter of its inferential relations to other concepts but only that awareness of the sort that we enjoy ...is acquired in the course of acculturation.
     From: report of John McDowell (Mind and World [1994]) by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.185
     A reaction: The first view is of Wilfred Sellars, who derives pragmatic relativism from his rejection of the Myth. This idea is helpful is seeing why McDowell has a good proposal. As I look out of my window, my immediate experience seems 'cultured'.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8253 Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell]
     Full Idea: The world's impressions on our senses are already possessed of conceptual content.
     From: John McDowell (Mind and World [1994], I.6)
     A reaction: This is a key idea of McDowell's, which challenges most traditional empiricist views, and (maybe) offers a solution to the rationalist/empiricist debate. His commitment to the 'space of reasons' strikes me as an optional extra.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23981 Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
     Full Idea: Can one fancy a state of rage and picture no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action? …A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.
     From: William James (What is an Emotion? [1884], p.194), quoted by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 3 'Bodily'
     A reaction: Plausible for rage, but less so for irritation or admiration. Goldie thinks James is wrong. James says if intellectual feelings don't become bodily then they don't qualify as emotions. No True Scotsman!
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
8254 Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell]
     Full Idea: The idea that concepts can be formed by abstraction from the Given just is the idea of private ostensive definition. So the Private Language Argument just is the rejection of the Given, in so far as it bears on the possibilities for language.
     From: John McDowell (Mind and World [1994], I.7)
     A reaction: I'm not clear why the process of abstraction from raw impressions shouldn't be a matter of public, explicit, community negotiation. We seem to be able to share and compare fairly raw impressions without much trouble (discussing sunsets).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').