Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'works' and 'A Plea for Substitutional Quantification'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: Modal logic is not an extensional language.
     From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.159 n8)
     A reaction: [I record this for investigation. Possible worlds seem to contain objects]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: I argue (against Quine) that the existential quantifier substitutionally interpreted has a genuine claim to express a concept of existence, which may give the best account of linguistic abstract entities such as propositions, attributes, and classes.
     From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
     A reaction: Intuitively I have my doubts about this, since the whole thing sounds like a verbal and conventional game, rather than anything with a proper ontology. Ruth Marcus and Quine disagree over this one.
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: For the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, a sentence of the form '(∃x) Fx' is true iff there is some closed term 't' of the language such that 'Ft' is true. For the objectual interpretation some object x must exist such that Fx is true.
     From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
     A reaction: How could you decide if it was true for 't' if you didn't know what object 't' referred to?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
     Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
     From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
     A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').