Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introduction - Ontology' and 'The Iliad'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


11 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Biologists don't split living things into a 'structural' level and an 'abstract' level; ..rather, they are organised at many levels, each level 'abstract' with respect to those beneath it, but 'structural' as it realises those levels above it.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
     A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction. Compare Idea 4601. It seems to fit well with the 'homuncular' picture of a hierarchical mind, and explains why there are so many levels of description available for mental life.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
     Full Idea: There is such a thing as synthetic and a posteriori identity that is nonetheless genuine identity, as in lightning being electrical discharge, and the Morning Star being Venus.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.5)
     A reaction: It is important to note that although these identities are synthetic a posteriori, that doesn't make them contingent. The early identity theorists like Smart seemed to think that it did. Kripke must be right that they are necessary identities.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Homer's descriptions of people did without a dualistic distinction between soul and body.
     From: report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.23
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Functionalism has three distinct levels of description: a neurophysiological description, a functional description (relative to a program which the brain is realising), and it may have a further mental description.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.6)
     A reaction: I have always thought that the 'levels of description' idea was very helpful in describing the mind/brain. I feel certain that we are dealing with a single thing, so this is the only way we can account for the diverse ways in which we discuss it.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Some theorists have said that the one-to-one correspondence between the organism and parts of its 'program' is too liberal, and suggest that the state and its functional role are seen teleologically, as functioning 'for' the organism.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
     A reaction: This seems an inevitable development, once the notion of a 'function' is considered. It has to be fitted into some sort of Aristotelian teleological picture, even if the functions are seen subjectively (by what?). Purpose is usually seen as evolutionary.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Homer left out another mental action lying between coming to a conclusion and acting on it; and he did well, since there is no such action, and the idea is the invention of bad philosophy.
     From: report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.37
     A reaction: This is a characteristically empiricist view, which is found in Hobbes. The 'will' seems to have a useful role in folk psychology. We can at least say that coming to a conclusion that I should act, and then actually acting, are not the same thing.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: In Plato the order of generation is from the Good, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul.
     From: report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE], 509b) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: The doctrine of Plotinus merely echoes Plato, in that case, except that the One replaces the Form of the Good. Does this mean that what is first in Plotinus is less morally significant, and more concerned with reason and being?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Let there be one ruler [Homer]
     Full Idea: The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler.
     From: Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE], 2.204), quoted by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 8.9
     A reaction: [Quoted by Aristotle at Metaphysics 1076a04]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
     Full Idea: There is now a small but vigorous industry whose purpose is to explicate biological teleology in naturalistic terms, typically in terms of causes.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.10)
     A reaction: This looks like a good strategy. In some sense, it seems clear that the moon has no purpose, but an eyeball has one. Via evolution, one would expect to reduce this to causation. Purposes are real (not subjective), but they are reducible.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Homer is so at home among his gods, and takes such delight in them as a poet, that he surely must have been deeply irreligious.
     From: report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Human, All Too Human 125
     A reaction: Blake made a similar remark about where the true allegiance of Milton lay in 'Paradise Lost'.