19 ideas
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
Full Idea: In Peirce's system, a super-ordinate discipline provides general laws or principles for subordinate disciplines, which in turn provide concrete examples of those general laws. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 1 'System' | |
A reaction: Does he really mean that subordinate disciplines have no principles or laws? That can't be right. |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: In Peirce's naturalist view of truth, it is a catch-all for the particular local aims of enquiry - empirical adequacy, predictive power, coherence, simplicity, elegance, explanatory power, a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness, great understanding. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 1 | |
A reaction: The aims I cited in my thesis on explanation. One given, for me, is that truth is an ideal, which may or may not be attainable, to varying degrees. It is just what thinking aims at. I suspect, though, that these listed items have one thing in common. |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: Peirce was not in the slightest bit tempted by the thought that a belief is true if it is useful. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 | |
A reaction: All students of the pragmatic theory of truth should start with this idea, because it rejects the caricature view of pragmatic truth, a view which is easily rebutted. James seems to have been guilty of this sin. |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
Full Idea: Two related worries about Peirce's account of truth are (from Royce) what are we to make of truth if enquiry never reaches an end, and (from Russell) what are we to make of truth if enquiry ends prematurely? | |
From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'issues' | |
A reaction: The defence of Peirce must be that the theory is not holistic - referring to the whole Truth about absolutely everything. The discovery of the periodic table seems to me to support Peirce. In many areas basic enquiry has reached an end. |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not there is any corresponding real thing, he does not care. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], CP5.567), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'separation' | |
A reaction: [Dated 1902] Maybe we should identify a huge branch of human learning as Hyptheticals. Professor of Hypotheticals at Cambridge University. The trouble is it would have to include computer games. So why does maths matter more than games? |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
Full Idea: Peirce takes bivalence not to be a law of logic, but a regulative assumption of enquiry. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 n10 | |
A reaction: I like this. For most enquiries it's either true or not true, it's either there or it's not there. When you aren't faced with these simple dichotomies (in history, or quantum mechanics) you can relax, and allow truth value gaps etc. |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.16 | |
A reaction: If this is anti-realism, then I don't like it. If it is realist, then it is probably a bit on the optimistic side (if you think about cultures that are into witchcraft and voodoo). |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: It was Peirce and Schröder in the nineteenth century who began a systematic taxonomy of relations. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], 4) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4 |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
Full Idea: The realism about possibilities, generalities, tendencies and habits that we find in Peirce's later maxim is something that the logical positivists would have been uncomfortable with. | |
From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 2 'Concl' | |
A reaction: Atkin examines the various later statements of the earlier maxim, given here in Idea 21490. Ryle and Quine express the empiricist and logical positivist approach to dispositions. |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The possible is necessarily general…..It is only actuality, the force of existence, which bursts the fluidity of the general and produces a discrete unit. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 13.1 | |
A reaction: [Papers 4 1967:147] This was quoted by Prior, and is often cited. Recanati is interested in the notion of a singular thought being tied to actuality, by generating a mental file. |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Inquiry is not standing upon a bedrock of fact. It is walking up a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay until it begins to give way. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892], CP 5.589), quoted by Gottfried Leibniz - Letter to Newton 4 | |
A reaction: [I don't know which article this lovely quote comes from] |
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: To fairly divide a cake between two children, the first divides it and the second chooses. …Even division is best, as it anticipates the second child will take the largest piece. Fairness is enforced by the children's self-interests. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Cake') | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is introduced as the basic principle of game theory. There is an online video of two cats sharing a dish of milk; each one drinks a bit, then pushes the dish to the other one. I'm sure two children could manage that. |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: At the most abstract level, game theory is about tables with numbers in them - numbers that entities are are efficiently acting to maximise or minimise. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Curve') | |
A reaction: A brilliant idea. The question is the extent to which real life conforms to the numberical tables. The assumption that everyone is entirely self-seeking is blatantly false. Numbers like money have diminishing marginal utility. |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The minimax theorem says that there is always a rational solution to a precisely defined conflict between two people whose interests are completely opposite. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 03 'Minimax') | |
A reaction: This is Von Neumann's founding theorem of game theory. It concerns maximising minimums, and minimising maximums. Crucially, I would say that it virtually never occurs that two people have completely opposite interests. There is a common good. |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The tragedy is when two 'nice' players defect because they misread the other's intentions. The puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma is how such good intentions pave the road to hell. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 11 'Howard's') | |
A reaction: I really wish these simple ideas were better known. They more or less encapsulate the tragedy of the human race, with its inability to prioritise the common good. |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: Prisoners A and B can support or betray one another. If both support, they each get 1 year in prison. If one betrays, the betrayer gets 0 and the betrayed gets 3. If they both betray they get 2 each. The common good is to support each other. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 06 'Tucker's') | |
A reaction: [by Albert Tucker, highly compressed] The classic Prisoner's Dilemma. It is artificial, but demonstrates that selfish behaviour gets a bad result (total of four years imprisonment), but the common good gets only two years. Every child should study this! |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: TIT FOR TAT threatens 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else!'. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: Essentially human happiness arises if we are all nice, but also stand up firmly for ourselves. 'Doormats' (nice all the time) get exploited. TIT FOR TAT is weak, because it doesn't exploit people who don't respond at all. |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
Full Idea: The successful TIT FOR TAT strategy (for the iterated prisoner's dilemma) says cooperate on the first round, then do whatever the other player did in the previous round. | |
From: William Poundstone (Prisoner's Dilemma [1992], 12 'TIT') | |
A reaction: There are also the tougher TWO TITS FOR A TAT, and the more forgiving TIT FOR TWO TATS. The one-for-one seems to be the main winner, and is commonly seen in animal life (apparently). I recommend this to school teachers. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |