9110
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The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
The words 'thing' and 'to be' (esse) signify one and the same thing, but the one in the manner of a noun and the other in the manner of a verb.
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From:
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii)
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A reaction:
Well said - as you would expect from a thoroughgoing nominalist. I would have thought that this was the last word on the subject of Being, thus rendering any need for me to read Heidegger quite superfluous. Or am I missing something?
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9109
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If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
If essence and existence were two things, then no contradiction would be involved if God preserved the essence of a thing in the world without its existence, or vice versa, its existence without its essence; both of which are impossible.
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From:
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], III,II,c,xxvii)
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A reaction:
Not that William is using the concept of a supreme mind as a tool in argument. His denial of essence as something separable is presumably his denial of the Aristotelian view of universals, as well as of the Platonic view.
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9105
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Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
Conceptual terms and the propositions formed by them are those mental words which do not belong to any language; they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered exteriorly, though signs subordinated to these can be exteriorly uttered.
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From:
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323], I.c.i)
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A reaction:
[He cites Augustine] A glimmer of the idea of Mentalese, and is probably an integral part of any commitment to propositions. Quine would hate it, but I like it. Logicians seem to dislike anything that cannot be articulated, but brains are like that.
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23684
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Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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Full Idea:
In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
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From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
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A reaction:
Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
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23690
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We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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Full Idea:
Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
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From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
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A reaction:
The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
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22379
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The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
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A reaction:
I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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