Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Meaning of the Word' and 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?'

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8 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
6710 You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
     Full Idea: Pragmatism insists that statements and beliefs are inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pass for true; but you cannot define what you mean by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities.
     From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.2)
     A reaction: I think this clarifies an objection to pragmatism, because all functional definitions (e.g. of the mind, or of moral behaviour) are preceded by the question of WHY this thing is able to function in this way. What special quality makes this possible?
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
22305 If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
     Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true.
     From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.299), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 35 'Prag'
     A reaction: How you get from 'widely satisfactory' to 'true' is beyond my comprehension. This is dangerous nonsense. This view of truth seems to be a commonplace in American culture. Peirce hurray! James boo! James accepted verification, where possible.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
13857 Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
     Full Idea: How likely is a fair die landing on an even number to land six? My approach is, assume an even number, so three possibilities, one a six, so 'one third'; the truth-functional approach is it's true if it is not-even or six, so 'two-thirds'.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 3)
     A reaction: The point is that in the truth-functional approach, if the die lands not-even, then the conditional comes out as true, when she says it should be irrelevant. She seems to be right about this.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13853 It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
     Full Idea: The mistake philosophers have made, in trying to understand the conditional, is to assume that its function is to make a statement about how the world is (or how other possible worlds are related to it), true or false, as the case may be.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: 'If pigs could fly we would never catch them' may not be about the world, but 'if you press this switch the light comes on' seems to be. Actually even the first one is about the world. I've an inkling that Edgington is wrong about this. Powers!
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13855 A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
     Full Idea: A conditional does not have truth conditions.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
13859 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
     Full Idea: X believes that if A, B, to the extent that he judges that A & B is nearly as likely as A, or (roughly equivalently) to the extent that he judges A & B to be more likely than A & ¬B.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 5)
     A reaction: This is a formal statement of her theory of conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
13854 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
     Full Idea: It is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
     A reaction: This is the basic Edgington view. It seems to involve an active thought process, and imagination, rather than being the static semantic relations offered by possible worlds analyses. True conditionals state relationships in the world.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').