116 ideas
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027) | |
A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree. |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68) | |
A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic. |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5 | |
A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm. |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science? |
16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Among the inferential virtues commonly cited are mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background beliefs. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding') | |
A reaction: [He cites Hempel, Kuhn, Quine, and Newton-Smith] I take the over-arching term 'coherence' to cover much of this, though a bolder hypothesis offers more than mere coherence. |
16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
Full Idea: All pairs of contraries entail a pair of contradictories, since one member of such a pair always entails the negation of the other. P&Q and not-P are contraries, but the first entails P, which is contradictory of not-P. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best') |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp) | |
A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road. |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'. |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind? |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Causality is a clue to what properties are real. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 9.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting variant on the Shoemaker proposal that properties actually are causal. I'm not sure that there is anything more to causality that the expression in action of properties, which I take to be powers. Structures are not properties. |
16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: On the causal model of explanation, understanding is unmysterious and objective; it is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge; knowledge of causes. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: There seems to be some distinction between revealing some causes, and revealing a cause which 'makes the light dawn'. |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point. |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent. | |
From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds. |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001) | |
A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present). |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself? |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'. |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are. |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All perception is intellectual. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it. |
16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: How can Best Explanation distinguish negative evidence from irrelevant evidence, when the evidence is logically consistent with the hypothesis? | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case') | |
A reaction: There seems no answer to this other than to assess batches of evidence by their coherence, rather than one at a time. Anomalies can be conclusive, or pure chance. |
16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The inferential path to unobservables is often the same as to unobserved observables. In these two sorts of case, the reason for belief can be equally strong, so the suggestion that we infer truth in one case but not the other seems perverse. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
A reaction: [Van Fraassen 1980 is the target of this] Van F seems to be in the grip of some sort of verificationism, which I always disliked on the grounds that speculation can be highly meaningful. Why embrace something because it 'could' be observed? |
16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Inductive inference is a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') | |
A reaction: This sounds like a plausible fallibilist response to the optimistic view of Aristotle. |
16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations are an important guide to inference, …we work out what to infer from our evidence by thinking about what would explain that evidence. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], Pref 2nd ed) | |
A reaction: I take this to be inferences about the physical world, rather than of pure logic. The thesis sounds a bit thin, since there is no logical sense of 'infer' here, so all it could mean is 'what caused that?'. |
16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are more impressed by the fact that the special theory of relativity was used to predict the shift in the perihelion of Mercury than we would have been if we knew that the theory was constructed in order to account for that effect. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 10 'The fudging') | |
A reaction: Lipton has a nice discussion of the relative merits of predicting data and accommodating it. He invites astrologers to predict events, rather than accommodate past ones. |
16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Accommodations are often worth less than predictions, because only they have to face the possibility that the best explanation of the fit between the theory and data is that the theoretical system was fudged. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
A reaction: Lipton illuminatingly explores the discovery by Semmelweiss of the cause of childbed fever. He predicted various explanations, and tested them out in a hospital. It clicks when the prediction occurs. |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The cost of the hypothetico-deductive method …is that we are left in the dark about the source of the hypotheses themselves. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: How do we distinguish a wild hypothesis from a plausible one? It can only be from patterns in the data, rather than mere accumulations of data. If water causes cholera, or smoking causes cancer, the hypothesis guides the data search. |
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Five attempts to describe induction are 'more of the same', the instantial model, the hypothetico-deductive model, the Bayesian approach …and causal inference. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: This interesting list totally fails to mention the best answer, which is essentialism! If you observe some instances, you only begin to think that there will be more of the same if you think you have discerned the essence. Ravens are black things! |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
Full Idea: One of the problems of the extrapolation and instantial models of confirmation is that they do not cover vertical inferences, where we infer from what we observe to something at a different level that is often unobservable. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: This is my preferred essentialist view of induction, that we don't just infer that future swans will be white, but also that whiteness is built into the biology of swans. There seems to be predictive induction and explanatory induction. |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
Full Idea: If an inference is inductive, then by definition it is underdetermined by the evidence and the rules of deduction. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
Full Idea: There is nothing illegitimate about giving arguments for beliefs one already holds. …So inductive justification of induction, while impotent against the skeptic, is legitimate for those who already rely on induction. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
A reaction: Not so fast! The first sentence is generally right, but if the 'beliefs one already holds' are beliefs about methods of argument, that is a different case. Compare 'this book is the word of God, because it says so in the book'. Can logic prove logic? |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are considering that there is something in ravens, a gene perhaps, that makes them black, and this cause is part of the essence of ravens. Birds lacking this cause could not interbreed with ravens. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: At last, the essentialist approach to induction! Of course, it is tricky to decide a priori whether there could be albino ravens. It only takes one white (interbreeding) raven to ruin a nice essentialist story. Individuals matter. |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The reason my shoe is white is not that it lacks some feature essential to ravens that makes them black. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'The Method') | |
A reaction: Good, but not totally true. If my shoes were made to grow from genes, and then had some raven spliced into them, we might manage it. That is an explanation, but a long way from the best one. Enquiry is explanations, not deductions. |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations help with the raven paradox since, while the raven hypothesis may provide an explanation for the blackness of a particular raven, neither the original hypothesis nor its contrastive explanation explain why the shoe is white. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: For me, the examination of ravens is a search for the essence of ravenhood, which is why non-ravens don't help. Of course, if you eliminate all culprits except one, you have your culprit, but will your evidence stand up in court? |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We cannot transform a non-black non-raven into a raven to see whether we get a simultaneous transformation from non-black to black, in the way we can transform a flame without sodium into a flame with sodium. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: A white shoe would be an example of a non-black non-raven. People mesmerised by the raven paradox are too concerned with investigation being a 'logical' process. Lipton makes a nice point. We need to know the nature of ravens. |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Without something like a hypothesis about the genes of ravens, we simply do not know what would count as a relevantly similar bird for comparison. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
A reaction: Lipton is endorsing the view that explanation should be 'contrastive', as well as aiming to discover the inner nature of ravens. He makes a good case for the contrastive approach. |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Old evidence seems to provide some confirmation, but Bayesianism does not allow for this, since old evidence will have a prior probability of one, and so have no effect on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In English, Bayes's Theorem says that there is a high confirmation when your hypothesis entails an unlikely prediction that turns out to be correct - a very plausible claim. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: Presumably the simple point is that a likely prediction could have been caused by many things, but an unlikely prediction will probably only be caused by that thing. |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In p(H|E) = p(E|H)p(H)/p(E), the left side is the 'posterior' probability of H given E, p(E|H) is the 'likelihood' of E given H, and the others are the 'priors' of H and E. Moving from right to left is known as 'conditionalization'. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations may play an important role in the actual mechanisms by which inquirers 'realize' Bayesian reasoning. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
A reaction: Lipton's strategy for making peace between IBE and Bayesians. Explanations give likeliness. The background question for Bayesians always seems to be how the initial probabilities are assigned. Pure logic won't do that job. |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Since the Bayesian account says a hypothesis is confirmed by any of its logical consequences …it seems to inherit the over-permissiveness of the hypothetico-deductive model. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
A reaction: This sounds like Hempel's Raven Paradox, where the probability of some logical consequences seems impossible to assess. |
16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanation is a partial answer to the descriptive problem of induction, …but the justificatory problem is recalcitrant, since it may seem particularly implausible that explanatory considerations should be a reliable guide to truth. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
A reaction: His claim that explanation is a guide to inference is intended to bridge the gap. One might say that a good explanation has to be true, so just make sure your explanation is 'good', according to a few criteria. |
16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the reason model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is to give a reason to believe that the phenomenon occurs. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [He cites Hempel 1965] Put like that, it doesn't sound very promising. Personally I believe things occur if my wife tells me they do, because I trust her. Lipton says knowing that it occurs is not understanding why it occurs. |
16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
Full Idea: On the 'familiarity' model of explanation, unfamiliar phenomena call for explanation, and good explanations somehow make them familiar. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: Lipton notes that his encourages explanation by analogy, but that may not add to understanding. A better version is that an explanation makes a phenomenon less surprising (but that sounds rather relative and subjective). |
16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The question about explanation can be put this way: What has to be added to knowledge to yield understanding? | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Underst') | |
A reaction: In the spirit of Aristotle, I take 'understanding' to be the end of all enquiry, even if it's rather open-ended, relative and vague. Presumably there are lots of true explanations which don't deliver understanding, because baffling ingredients are cited. |
16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
Full Idea: One of the points of our obsessive search for explanations is that this is a peculiarly effective way of discovering the structure of the world. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: This remark is a nice corrective to the sceptical view that explanations are entirely subjective, pragmatic, and even conventional. Whether this means that there are 'real' and 'objective' explanations is another matter. |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: In explaining a phenomenon one can cite the causes of that phenomenon; or one can set the phenomenon in a general theoretical framework. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 4.1) | |
A reaction: The thing is, you need to root an explanation in something taken as basic, and theoretical frameworks need further explanation, whereas causes seem to be basic. |
16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: In a 'contrastive' explanation what gets explained is not 'Why this?', but 'Why this rather than that?'. There is a fact and a foil, and one fact may have several foils. Why do leaves turn yellow in November rather than in January? | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: Lipton really likes this, and builds his story around it. Maybe, but it looks to me like an easier step towards a proper explanation. The foils are infinite. Why turn yellow rather than radioactive, insincere, divisible by three, or expensive? |
16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The class of possible causes is often too big, …but if we are lucky or clever enough to find or produce a contrast where fact and foil have similar histories, most potential explanations are immediately 'cancelled out', and we have a research programme. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case') | |
A reaction: He has a nice example of a triumph in 19th century German epidemiology. Once you get a good hypothesis, you can set up comparisons, based on a possible fact and a good foil. Genius is spotting hypothesis and foil. Nice. |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for the messy and complicated phenomenological laws that are true of it. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This summarises the core of her view in this book. She is after models rather than laws, and the models are based on causes. |
16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the 'unification' model of explanation, we come to understand a phenomenon when we see how it fit together with other phenomena into unified whole. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [He cites Kitcher 1989] This works quite well for a lot of explanation, but a revolutionary explanation might involve a completely new theory. Lipton says it is rather linguistic, and has no room for a regress of causes, or for singular explanations. |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: We explain by ceteris paribus laws, by composition of causes, and by approximations that improve on what the fundamental laws dictate. In all of these cases the fundamental laws patently do not get the facts right. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: It is rather headline-grabbing to say in this case that laws do not get the facts right. If they were actually 'wrong' and 'lied', there wouldn't be much point in building explanations on them. |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: When different kinds of causes compose, we want to explain what happens in the intersection of different domains. But the laws we use are designed only to tell truly what happens in each domain separately. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Since presumably the laws are discovered through experiments which try to separate out a single domain, in those circumstances they actually are true, so they don't 'lie'. |
16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Deduction models of explanation make it far too easy to explain. You can explain that planets move in an ellipse from the conjunction of the fact that they do, together with any law you please, say a law in economics. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Much criticism of the original covering-law model objects that it lets in too much. It seems we can explain Henry's failure to get pregnant by his taking birth control pills, and we can explain the storm by the falling barometer. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.0) | |
A reaction: I take these examples to show that true explanations must be largely causal in character. The physicality of causation is what matters, not 'laws'. I'd say the same of attempts to account for causation through counterfactuals. |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the extreme, that there is a law to cover every case. I do not. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The problem of coincidence is somewhere at the back of this thought. Innumerable events have their own explanations, but it is hard to explain their coincidence (see Aristotle's case of bumping into a friend in the market). |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: 'Why does that quail in the garden bob its head up and down in that funny way whenever it walks?' …'Because they all do'. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.5) | |
A reaction: She cites this as an old complaint against the covering-law model of explanation. It captures beautifully the basic error of the approach. We want to know 'why', rather than just have a description of the pattern. 'They all do' is useful information. |
16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The hypothetico-deductive model does not account for the negative impact of explanatory failure. We reject hypotheses because they fail to explain contrasts, not because they are logically incompatible with them. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: The general move in modern accounts of investigation is away from an excessive emphasis on logic that used to be favoured. The underpinning of this is that science concerns mechanisms more than equations. |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: The covering-law account supposes that there is, in principle, one 'right' explanation for each phenomenon. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably the law is held to be 'right', but there must be a bit of flexibility in describing the initial conditions, and the explanandum itself. |
16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Many ordinary explanations include no laws and allow no deduction, yet are not incomplete or mere sketches. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: The simplest sort of explanation simply shows the underlying cause. |
16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the 'necessity' model of explanation, an explanation shows that the phenomenon in question had to occur. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
A reaction: [He cites Glymour 1980] Lipton objects that the sort of necessity involved is too uncertain, can't account for the 'why-regress', and doesn't fit everyday explanation, like why we abandoned the football match. |
16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: I take it that we may think about causes without thinking especially about explanations, and so we might judge likeliest cause without considering loveliest explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') |
16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to the causal model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is simply to give information about its causal history, or, where the phenomenon is itself a causal regularity, to give information about the mechanism linking cause and effect. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: [He cites Lewis's 1986 paper] Simply citing causal regularity seems to me to explain nothing. It happened because it always happens. Mechanism, on the other hand, is just what we are after. |
16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Mathematical explanations are never causal, and philosophical explanations seldom are. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
A reaction: There may still be a 'direction' of explanation in mathematics, as when the nature of the triangle explains the Pythagoras Theorem, but the theorem may not give you the basic nature of triangles. Lipton suggests 'determination' for 'causation'. |
16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
Full Idea: It is often easier to say what a factor would explain than it is to say what it would cause. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
A reaction: Presumably the presence of some factor might explain something, but the factor itself might have mysterious causal powers. A catalyst, for example. We don't need to understand the factor that explains. |
16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Our most secure basis for causal inference is manipulation, as when flicking the switch causes the light to go on. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
A reaction: Correct, but Woodward elevates this into an entire theory of causation, which does not convince me. |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We understand a phenomenon better when we know not just what caused it, but how the cause operated. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding') | |
A reaction: This is the key point behind the desire for 'mechanism' in explanation. It strikes me as undeniable. |
16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
Full Idea: If all we wanted was to maximise probability, we would never venture beyond our data. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'friends') |
16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: A suspicion is that Inference to the Best Explanation is nothing more than Inference to the Likeliest Cause in fancy dress, and so fails to account for the symptoms of likeliness. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
A reaction: In a lot of cases the cause is the explanation. An explanation might be the absence of a cause (as in 'you forgot to switch it on'). Lipton's 'lovely' explanations go further, and reveal a network of causes. |
16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The core idea of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. …Inserting one of the standard models of explanation yields disappointing results, because of their backward state. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: Inferences tend to come one at a time, but I see best explanations as the formation of coherent pictures. The tricky bit is when to decide the coherence makes it acceptable. Lipton has that problem too, with his inferences. 'Working explanations'. |
16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between the explanation best supported by the evidence, and the explanation that would provide the most understanding: in short, between the 'likeliest' and the 'loveliest' explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: A very nice, very real and very illuminating distinction. Presumably truth must play an important role in both likelihood and loveliness. |
16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: According to Inference to the Best Explanation we do not infer the best actual explanation; rather we infer that the best of the available potential explanations is an actual explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: Clearly to say that you should just accept the best available explanation is asking for trouble, if all the available explanations are absurd. But what are the criteria for saying the best one is the actual one? |
16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We should considere Inference to the Loveliest Potential Explanation, …which links the search for truth and the search for understanding in a fundamental way. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') |
16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The slogan 'Inference to the Best Explanation' may bring to mind an excessively passive picture of scientific enquiry, …but there is the feedback between hypothesis formation and data acquisition that characterises actual enquiry. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: Perhaps it should be renamed 'Search for the Best Explanation'. |
16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: We are to infer that a difference marks a cause just in case the difference would provide the best explanation of the contrast. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'Improved') | |
A reaction: Lipton's offers this as his distinctive contribution to Mill's methods of enquiry. His point is that we draw inferences for explanatory reasons. He rests on Mill, and on contrastive explanation. It sounds rightish, but a bit optimistic. |
16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Explanatory considerations can play a role in the generation of potential explanations as well as in the subsequent selection from among them. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'The two-stage') | |
A reaction: Lipton offers this to meet an obvious objection to Inference to the Best Explanation - that compiling the possible explanations seems to need guidance. Seems a good reply. |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There are a huge number of cases in the history of science where we now know our best explanations were false. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [She cites Laudan 1981 for this] The Ptolemaic system and aether are the standard example cited for this. I believe strongly in the importance of best explanation. Only a fool would just accept the best explanation available. Coherence is needed. |
16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Two problems for IBE are that only one explanation can be inferred from any set of data, and that the only data that are relevant to a hypothesis are data the hypothesis explains. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
A reaction: I don't see why the theory prohibits a tie for what is 'best', given that you don't have to commit. The second one is partly to do with what observers should do about anomalies, and it is sometimes right to ignore them. |
16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Bayesians object to inference to the best explanation, because someone who favoured powerful ('lovely') explanations would end up with an incoherent distribution of states of belief. They would be persuaded by loss-making wagers (a 'dutch book'). | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
A reaction: [compressed; he cites Van Fraassen 1989 Ch.7] Lipton's Ch. 7 tries to address this issue. |
16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The best theory is almost always boring. …The claim that all planets move in ellipses is interesting, and the claim that some do not is not interesting. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best') | |
A reaction: This applies to any extraction of a universal 'law' by induction. The best theory just affirms what has been observed. How could generalising about what you haven't observed be 'better'? Answer: because it goes via the essence. |
16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
Full Idea: Inference to the best explanation cannot be epistemically effective, since an actual explanation must be true, so one would have to know the truth before one could infer an explanation. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
A reaction: Lipton rests on 'contrastive' explanation, so that the one that explains more is more likely to be true. If true, it explains. That seems to me correct, even though it could occasionally go horribly wrong. Approach explanation cautiously. |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth? |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will' | |
A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea. |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!). |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54) | |
A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to. |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity. |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023) | |
A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation. |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018) | |
A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing. |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal | |
From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42] | |
A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot. |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being. |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp) | |
A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant. |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it. |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it. |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems. |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong. |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3 | |
A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too. |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41) | |
A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded. |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial' | |
A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it. |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics.... |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right. |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13 | |
A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?" |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever. |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing. |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man. |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires? |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's. |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful. |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60) | |
A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!). |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: A cause ought to increase the frequency of the effect, but this fact may not show up in the probabilities if other causes are at work. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Patrick Suppes for this one] Presumably in experimental situations you can weed out the interference, but that threatens to eliminate mere 'probability' entirely. |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects. | |
From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
A reaction: Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient? |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Nancy Cartwright distinguishes between 'fundamental explanatory laws', which we should not believe, and 'phenomenological laws', which are regularities established on the basis of observation. | |
From: report of Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4 | |
A reaction: The distinction is helpful, so that we can be clearer about what everyone is claiming. We can probably all agree on the phenomenological laws, which are epistemological. Personally I claim truth for the best fundamental explanatory laws. |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Philosophers distinguish phenomenological from theoretical laws. Phenomenological laws are about appearances; theoretical ones are about the reality behind the appearances. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm suspecting that Humeans only really believe in the phenomenological kind. I'm only interested in the theoretical kind, and I take inference to the best explanation to be the bridge between the two. Cartwright rejects the theoretical laws. |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to think that the principles that best organise will be true, nor that the principles that are true will organise much. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, as axiomatisations of the observed patterns in nature. |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To get from a detailed factual knowledge of a situation to an equation, we must prepare the description of the situation to meet the mathematical needs of the theory. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: She is clearly on to something here, as Galileo is blatantly wrong in his claim that the book of nature is written in mathematics. Mathematics is the best we can manage in getting a grip on the chaos. |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: For explanation simple laws must have the same form when they act together as when they act singly. ..But then what the law states cannot literally be true, for the consequences that occur if it acts alone are not what occurs when they act in combination. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.6) | |
A reaction: This is Cartwright's basic thesis. Her point is that the laws 'lie', because they claim to predict a particular outcome which never ever actually occurs. She says we could know all the laws, and still not be able to explain anything. |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Where theories intersect, laws are usually hard to come by. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There are attempts at so-called 'bridge laws', to get from complex theories to simple ones, but her point is well made about theories on the same 'level'. |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity? |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63) | |
A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought. |