165 ideas
22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.58 | |
A reaction: Plato and Aristotle also distinguished their esoteric from their exoteric writings, but this is an indication that thei popular works may always have presented safer doctrines. |
13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: To win true freedom you must be a slave to philosophy. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 008 | |
A reaction: A lovely idea. It is one thing to free the body, or to free one's social situation, but the challenge to 'free your mind' is either romantic nonsense or totally baffling, apart from the suggestion offered here. Reason is freedom. Very Kantian. |
22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is an activity which secures the happy life by arguments and discussions. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Ethicists (one book) VI.169 | |
A reaction: Presumably this aims at the happiness of the participant. Universal happiness would need to be much more political. If this is your aim then you can't just follow the winds of the argument, but must channel it towards happiness. No nasty truths? |
14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: I congratulate you, sir, because you have come to philosophy free of any taint of culture. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source: Athenaeus, 'Deipnosophists' 13 588b] No one nowadays thinks such an aspiration remotely possible, not least because the culture is embedded in your native language, but I find the idea very appealing. |
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Just as the tiniest error in navigation may lead to a landfall even on the wrong continent, so the acceptance of apparently innocuous principles can lead to doctrines which, if accepted, would render intellectual life impossible. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
A reaction: If one lived life by an axiom system, and one of the axioms was a bit off kilter, then this idea would be a powerful one. Note that it is only 'intellectual' life that is screwed up, but even there a plurality of ideas keep correcting one another. |
22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Just as there is no benefit to medicine if it does not heal the sicknesses [nosos] of bodies, so too there is none to philosophy unless it expels that affections of the soul. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], fr 221), quoted by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.78 | |
A reaction: This sounds rather Buddhist, if the only route to happiness is to suppress the emotions. Epicurus probably refers to the more extreme desires, which only lead to harm. Galen quotes Chrysippus as endorsing this idea (see footnote 5). |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: In our view the task of a philosopher is to devise and critically assess conceptual schemes in the service of some overall vision of the world. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.B) | |
A reaction: This makes theology just as genuinely a branch of philosophy as their scientific essentialism. Is there any sort of philosophy, then, which is not 'in the service' of some independent worldview? Interesting. Note 'devise', as well as 'assess'. |
1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: We should make no assertion about the whole when our contact is with the parts. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109e |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Adequate accounts of those concepts which are neither purely formal nor simply psychological can be achieved by attention to ....the content of our knowledge, content which goes beyond the reports of immediate experience. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
A reaction: I like this one. Most proponents of analysis are either bogged down in trying to reduce all of our talk to formal logic, or else they think that they are just analysing how we think. It's neither, because the concepts arise from the world. |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The Humean view has led philosophers to suppose that their task is to provide an analysis of key concepts and relations wholly in terms drawn from formal logic, since relations of necessity are, in their view, fundamentally logical relations | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
A reaction: A very sharp observation about why logic has become central to contemporary philosophy. As far as I can see, logic steadily increases its dominance, to the point where ordinary metaphysical thought is being squeezed out. |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Positivism is the doctrine that the content of scientific propositions is exhausted by what can be immediately experienced. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.I) | |
A reaction: The simple thing missing from positivism is inference to the best explanation. Also, if you actually rule out other propositions as 'meaningless', you rule out speculation, which would certainly cripple science. |
2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.30.97 |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: From a logical point of view all definitions look exactly alike, that is, they contain a logical subject and a set of predicates which are attributed of necessity to that subject. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) |
21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus said that not every proposition is either true or false. ...Epicurus was afraid that if he admits that every proposition is true or false he will also have to admit that all events are caused by fate (if they are so from all eternity). | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.21 | |
A reaction: Epicurus proposed his 'swerve' in the movements of atoms to avoid this fatalism. Epicurus is agreeing with Aristotle, who did not accept excluded middle for a future contingent sea-fight. |
21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicureans make the impudent assertion that disjunctions consisting of contrary propositions are true, but that the statements contained in the propositions are neither of them true. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 16.36 | |
A reaction: Is that 'it is definitely one or the other, but we haven't a clue which one'? Seems to fit speculations about Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't sound terribly impudent to me. Or is it the crazy 'It's definitely one of them, but it's neither of them'? |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Points can be 'dense' by indefinitely prolonged division. To be 'continuous' is more stringent; the points must be cut into two sets, and meet the condition laid down by Boscovich and Dedekind. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: This idea goes with Idea 15274, which lays down the specification of the Dedekind Cut, which is the criterion for the real (and continuous) numbers. Harré and Madden are interested in whether time can support continuity of objects. |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Divide points into left and right set. They're 'continuous' if that point is either last member of left set, and greatest lower bound of right (so no least member), or least upper bound of left set (so no last member) and first member of right set. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: The best attempt I have yet encountered to explain a Dedekind Cut for the layperson. I gather modern mathematicians no longer rely on this way of defining the real numbers. |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The assumption that there is an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the psychological is, in our view, an error of enormous consequence. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely with this, and am opposed to the Fregean view of the matter. The psychology is the bridge between the physical world and the logic. Frege had to be a platonist, so that the formalism could latch onto something. |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Given the Humean ontology, there is grave difficulty in making any sense at all of the concept of change with continuity as distinct from successive replacements. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6. Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence the four-dimensionalist approach is basically Hume updated. The weird nature of time lurks behind this difficulty. If you can separate the moments of time, you can separate the bits of a continuous thing, and then ask how they relate. |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: On our view, 'event' is to be understood in terms of the ontology of enduring things, while on the Humean view enduring things are conceived to be constructions of events. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: It has quite hard to take either objects or events, given that they seem to be amenable to analysis. I am tempted to take essences as primitive. They fix identity, endure change, bear accidental properties (including temporary intrinsics). |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: By a shift from events to things we claim to make the big problem of induction tractable. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II) | |
A reaction: [You'll have to read their chapter to get the whole picture] The idea of basing a metaphysics on 'events' gives me the creeps, given the difficulty of individuating an event. Events are not primitive; even animals can analyse their components. |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Fundamental particulars are incapable of change. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV) | |
A reaction: I quote this in order to challenge it. If the proton can decay (which seems to be the case) maybe everything can. The fundamentals of a lawn mower eventually rust away; it may be thus with universe. What evidence could deny this? |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
A reaction: We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician. |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The magnetic and the gravitation field can occupy all the same places without merging. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
A reaction: We can divide stuff into two classes, then, according to whether they usually merge if coextensive in space. Oil and water can be mixed, but eventually separate again. |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The region around a magnetic body, the space between earth and moon, and the vicinity of an electric cable remain obstinately and, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
A reaction: Ouch, if you are a strict 'materialist'! I call myself a 'naturalist', in a hand-wavy sort of way. On materialism and determinism I remain vague. |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: A state of affairs consists of structures of particulars that endure (of which physical objects would be one type), the properties and powers of those particulars, and the relations obtaining among them. A common 'event' is a change in state of affairs. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: I find 'event' to be so vague, and so dependent on pragmatic interests, that it has hard to find a place for it in an ontological system. Ditto with state of affairs. They overlap. States of affairs can survive change (like a political majority). |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Causality is a clue to what properties are real. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 9.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting variant on the Shoemaker proposal that properties actually are causal. I'm not sure that there is anything more to causality that the expression in action of properties, which I take to be powers. Structures are not properties. |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The connectivity of ensembles of predicates is characteristic of natural science, while the independence of empirical predicates is the requirement of the Humean position. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
A reaction: This is yet another excellent reason for getting rid of the hyperempirical Humean view of these things. The best explanation of the world is that its ingredients are clearly not 'independent' of each other. |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The concept of energy was introduced into physics precisely to make possible the application of the 'store of potency' paradigm in cases like the contact of billiard balls, since the moving ball is clearly an agent of change. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: I find this to be a hugely revealing little observation. For years the nature of energy has bothered me, and I have been struck by the active character of nature. I am beginning to understand the world! |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Some powerful particulars require to be stimulated before their powers are manifested. Others will manifest their powers whenever the impediments to action, the constraints, are removed. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.V) | |
A reaction: Sounds nice and clear, but if gunpowder explodes at a certain temperature, how can you distinguish temperatures as the 'stimulus' ones and the 'release' ones? We just remove the constraint of low temperature. |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Contrasted with variable powers are those powers which cannot be diminished or augmented without loss of identity for the particular to which they are ascribed. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.I) | |
A reaction: They give the example of a Deputy Sheriff's powers, as one that cannot vary. I suppose the powers of an electron are in the fixed category. Fair enough. Can a fundamental power be variable (or only 'complex' powers)? |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: For scientists 'copper' refers to something having the properties of malleability, fusibility, ductility, electric conductivity, density 8.92, atomic weight 63.54, and atomic number 19. All but the last of these are dispositional. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
A reaction: This is important because it is tempting to pick the atomic number as the essence of copper, but it is the only one on the list which is structural rather than dispositional. The deep question is why that substance has those dispositions. |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The power of particulars are always made understandable by the natures of those particulars, but finally such explanations come to rest with a power of a particular that has no explanation in the nature of that thing or bit of material. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII) | |
A reaction: I'm glad they faced up to this matter. The question is whether the fundamental powers which are the terminus of explanation are the same sort of thing as the powers which were said to be the target for explanations. Just complex powers? |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: As the most promising candidate for entities which intrinsically qualify as ultimate because their nature is in principle identical with their powers we will offer a physical field. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII) | |
A reaction: An electron comes fairly close to being nothing but a bundle of powers, but fields seem to have a slightly more basic role in physics, so this strikes me as a good suggestion. It meets Ladyman's mocking of the 'microbangings' view. |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: An attribution of a power opens up a certain direction of empirical investigation. It is not an attribution of an occult quality, because it is not a quality-attribution at all. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 5.II) | |
A reaction: They seem to have a rather behaviouristic view of powers, which I am inclined to think misses how fundamental powers are. I see fundamental powers as the terminus of empirical investigation (which focuses on how powers combine). |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: How are we to conceive of a field of potentials when the very point of the notion is that it serves to describe what would happen at various places, and is not a description of what did or is happening? | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
A reaction: I suppose the answer is induction. If there were no events, the field would be beyond us. We infer the field from observed events, and infer possible events from the patterns of behaviour in the field, and its nature. |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: In being properly critical about the merits of the concept of substance, ...the Humean finds he has lost the vitally important concept of a thing as well. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: This is the whole reason that Aristotle and others started talking about substances in the first place. The big mistake is to think that Aristotle believes in a thing called 'substance'. The notion is a placeholder for whatever holds a thing together. |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The importance of the field concept (as ultimate) is that it allows us to escape from the apparently pervasive concepts of substance and its properties. A field has no substance other than its powers (or its potentials). | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII) | |
A reaction: You can't run away from substance by only thinking about what is ultimate. Are they going to ignore separate objects? What gives them identity? Do they have any properties? What has the properties? More work needed here. |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The assumption that shape and solidity are the fundamental mechanical qualities requires an implausible hypothesis of a substance or material filling the space of bodies. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.II.B) | |
A reaction: This is 'substance' in the sense of matter, rather than in the sense of an Aristotelian essence. They defend fields (rather than particles) as the fundamentals of the physical world. |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Chemical analysis either arrives at a qualityless substance, the notorious substratum, or is obliged to declare certain qualities primary and inexplicable. Substituting individuals-with-powers for substance-with-qualities removes these difficulties. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.II) | |
A reaction: Any account gives you something as basic, and that something is always going to seem inherently and deeply mysterious. I prefer powers to substrata, but what has the powers? They like 'fields'. |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: From the point of view of philosophical logic, the nature of a kind, or a material substance or an individual is its essence, that is, those of its qualities which are inseparable from its being that kind, that material or that individual. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.I) | |
A reaction: This might be where the logical and the naturalistic notions of essence come apart. Could something retain its 'natural' essence while losing its identity, or lose its essence while retaining its identity? |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: If we know the nature of a particular that explains its properties, powers and capacities and relates them into intelligible clusters, then we can indeed infer from some of the powers and properties to others via its essential nature. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.III) | |
A reaction: This is an optimistic assertion of precisely the possibility which Locke denied in Idea 12547. This optimism is the main reason for the revival of scientific essentialism in recent years. It just seems to be true of modern science. |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The essential nature of matter and radiation is energy, so it is maintained, but the point of maintaining this is precisely to allow one to make use of a notion of the nature of things. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.III) | |
A reaction: They are defending essentialism, but this seems to be a counterexample, of our need to postulate essences where there are none. It makes our explanations work better, but at the cost of commitment to a 'quasi-substance' (Idea 15265). |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Talk about particulars remaining the same and yet lacking their usual capacities and powers is at once to assert and deny that a certain object or sample of material has a given nature. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
A reaction: They imply that this is a contradiction, and hence impossible. So what do we say about something in which the powers fade? Do they both retain and lose their identity? Or can we separate essence from identity?? Aha! |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Some individuals to gain or lose certain capacities or powers, but do not thereby lose their identity. They still have the same nature. A drug, or photographic paper, may lose effectiveness over time. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
A reaction: Damn! I thought I was the first to spot this problem! I, however, take it to be much more metaphysically significant than Harré and Madden do. The question is whether those properties were essential, since they can be lost. Essential but not necessary! |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Change might mean that a particular lost some or perhaps all of its previous characteristics and retained at worst only a dubious numerical identity derived from temporal continuity of the occupation of a place or continuous sequence of places. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.II) | |
A reaction: If all that is left is its location, that seems like passing-away rather than change. A dead leaf retains mere numerical identity while losing its essence. A burnt-up leaf might have a location, but it hardly qualifies as a 'leaf'. |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Since discontinuities in a dense set of temporal points lead to doubts about the existential integrity of a thing, the thing-ontology demands that a dense time be continuous. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather unequivocal assertion about a rather uncertain topic. If quanta can move in 'leaps', which appear to abolish the notion of what happens 'between' two states, who can say what objects might manage to do? |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: If events are instantaneous time-slices of a physical thing, the persistence of the pattern is an inexplicable fact in that there is no requirement for the successive time-slices to bear any resemblance to the event previously occurring at that place. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: The Humean four-dimensional view doesn't seem to require an explanation of this (or of much else), and takes it as a brute fact that slices resemble. Something has to be a brute fact, I suppose. |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: A Humean cannot step in the same river twice, not because the river is always a different river, but because he can strictly have no such concept as 'river'. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II) | |
A reaction: This arises from a discussion of induction. What is a Humean to make of an object which keeps changing? They only have connected impressions, and no underlying essence to hold the impressions together. |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Whatever reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.IV) | |
A reaction: This is a deeply stirring idea, because it suddenly opens up a research project of narrowing the possibilities, with a stunning Holy Grail at the end of it. Sherlock Holmes said this first, of course. |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: In addition to absolute necessity ('p is strictly implied by Źp'), i.e. p strictly implied by any proposition whatever, C.I. Lewis also distinguished relative necessity ('p implied by what is given or known'). | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
A reaction: Once you accept this distinction you find that the 'relative' one comes in all sorts of degrees. You "have to" put more salt in this soup. (Deontic' necessity, someone on Twitter tells me!) |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: When the logical form of a statement is offered as the grounds for the judgement that it cannot be true we have logical necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a truth about logical necessity, but certainly not a full account of it, because contingent statements also have logical form. I can't think of any other criterion than the finding of a contradiction buried in the logical form. |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The relation between what a thing is and what it is capable of doing and undergoing is naturally necessary. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
A reaction: Note that this was written in 1975, and in no way rests of Kripkean notions of rigid designation and necessary identities. Needs thought, but I take it to be an appealing proposal. |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Natural necessity is neither a mere reflection of logical necessity nor a roundabout way of referring to empirical contingency. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.B) | |
A reaction: They offer a strong defence of natural necessity, which is basic to their scientific essentialism. The key point is that they, unlike some others, are not defending metaphysical necessity about nature, but finding a different type of necessity. Good. |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: When the natures of the operative powerful particulars, the constraining or stimulating effect of conditions and so on are offered as the grounds for the judgement that a certain effect cannot but happen (or fail), we have natural necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
A reaction: This is the view I subscribe to, the really right bit of scientific essentialism. Can this view be proved? Hm. I take the opposite view to be the misguided Humean idea that if you can imagine it not happening, then it might not happen. Firey furnace. |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: At the basis of all doubts about the rationality of science lies the idea that there is no rational resting place between logical necessity and absolute contingency. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that when someone says "I have to go now", they express a necessity. Are there thousands of types of necessity, or one conditional necessity resting on thousands of different foundations? |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The relationship between co-existing properties or successive events or states is naturally necessary when understood by scientists to be related by generative mechanisms, whose structure and components constitute the essential natures of the world. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
A reaction: Does that mean that the relationship between an actual state and a possible state is metaphysically necessary, rather than naturally necessary? I think we need dispositions to be part of actuality, and hence replace 'co-existing' with 'possible'. |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: There is a necessity corresponding to the nature of the actual. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.III.C) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan for the assertion of a genuine and distinct natural necessity. Hence every possible world will have its own distinctive natural necessity. If the actual contains the possible, then there are possible new natural necessities in the actual! |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: When the conditions for a rational being having knowledge of the nature of a world are offered as the grounds for the judgement that such a world must have certain characteristics, we have transcendental necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
A reaction: It seems like a rather hard call to decide whether such characteristics pertain to the world, or to the mind of the rational being. Kant is obviously behind this one. You must read his first Critique at least four times to evaluate it. |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Whatever is logically necessary must be reflected in a corresponding transcendental necessity. But there are a great range of transcendental necessities which are not reflected in any logical necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.C) | |
A reaction: That is, the world would be unknowable if any of the logical necessities failed to apply to it. I hope that doesn't mean that we are supposed to intuitively know all the logical necessities. Nowadays we are famous for being bad at that. |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: We understand subjunctive conditionals as statements about possibilities, excluding those actualised. So that form is just right for part of the analysis of a power statement, since to say a thing has a power is to say what behaviour is possible for it. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 5.VII) | |
A reaction: They seem unaware of the famous work of Stalnaker and Lewis on this type of analysis, but as a fan of powers I find this interesting, and it offers a nice extra piece for my big jigsaw. |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: When a natural necessity is used as the basis for the inclusion or exclusion of the appropriate predicate in the meaning of a concept of a kind of particular, then it is conceptually necessary that that kind of particular has that property or power. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V.B) | |
A reaction: This is one of the bolder views of Harré and Madden, since many philosophers would say that conceptual necessity rests entirely on convention rather than on nature. We could cut them out by just saying that most of our conventions rest on nature. |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Described as a man it is quite contingent that he has a child, but described as a father it is conceptually necessary that he has a child. But that conceptual necessity is a reflection of the natural necessity of the father's role in reproduction. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I) | |
A reaction: This is a (good) response to Quine's claim that necessity depends entirely on the mode of description (and his mathematician cyclist example). |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The question about conceptual necessity is whether it is only stipulative and conventional in character or whether it mirrors something about the nature of physical systems. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.A) | |
A reaction: This is the key question, which fans of conventionalism (such as Sidelle) don't seem to face up to. I take it to be important that our concepts are not created by a committee of fools, but by people constantly relating to the world. |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: When discoveries about the nature of a thing or substance explain or justify our holding that certain properties are its nominal essence, then the diachronic process of meaning development creates a genuine conceptual necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.VI) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a pretty good account of one of the bases for conceptual necessity. They seem to think that conceptual necessity rests on a mixture of real and nominal essence (but then some of the nominal features are also real). |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The concepts of necessity and contingency are detached from those of the apriori and the a posteriori. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to arise quite independently of Kripke, from the attack by the authors on the Humean view of modality. They also mention the possibility of the apriori contingent. |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Even in cases (such as Goldbach's Conjecture) which, if true, are logically necessary, we may be able to conceive the opposite. We can conceive of there being a number which is not the sum of two primes. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: [attributed to Kneale] Ah, but can we conceive this (as Descartes would say) 'clearly and distinctly'? I can conceive circular squares, as long as I don't concentrate too hard. |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: It would be silly to suggest that what is a matter of experience must be justified by reason, and it makes no sense to say that what we are insisting upon as a matter of direct experience must itself be established by experience. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: The first half is now known as the 'Moorean' view (Idea 6349). It does make sense, when faced with a weird experience, to assess and establish it by means of a combination of reason and other experiences. It's called 'coherence'! |
1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We could not seek for anything if we had not some notion of it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21 |
5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says that colours are not intrinsic to bodies but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye, which implies that body is no more colourless than coloured. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], Fr 30) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1110 | |
A reaction: This seems to me such a self-evident truth that I am puzzled as to why anyone would claim that colours are real features of bodies. Epicurus points out that entering a dark room we see no colour, but then colour appears after a while. |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: It seems clear that we are never presented with a quality except of some object. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that that 'seems clear'. The idea of sense-data is that while it seems to be of an object, reason suggests that the experience of the quality must precede the object assembled thereby. How do you arbitrate? |
1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sensation is out of reach of control, because one sensation cannot judge another which resembles itself, as they have equal value, and different sensations have different objects. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 | |
A reaction: Scepticism about the possibility of purely empirical knowledge; an interesting comment on the question of whether perceptions contain any intrinsic knowledge. |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: To the objection that one is never aware of inferences in sensation, the unconvincing reply comes that such inferences are automatic, telescoped, non-discursive and unconscious. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: I think the 'unconvincing' reply is a bit more convincing in the light of modern research on the brain, which presents everything it does in a far less conscious light than the traditional view. Even reason seems barely conscious. |
1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The Humean event, the impression, basic to his epistemology, is, as we have seen, instantaneous in nature, punctiform and elemenentary, and from this characterisation follows its atomicity, its lack of internal connections with anything else. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: This simple point about Humean associationism is the key to grasping the whole hideous worldview that has gripped twentieth century philosophy. How many impressions make up an apple? And why do they sum to make something? |
1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Reason cannot judge the senses, because it is based on them. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.20 |
4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Epicurus denied the possibility of knowledge in order to retain moral (or hedonistic) values as the highest values. | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §578 | |
A reaction: The history of philosophy suggests that this dichotomy is unnecessary. Dogmatist place a high value on multitudes of things. |
2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.25.79 |
1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: On entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1110d |
1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: In the very same bath some treat the water as too hot, others as too cold. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: If one person says the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet? | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Clavius' Paradox shows that a theorem-like structure organised by entailments cannot be identified as a scientific explanation by reference to syntactical criteria, since it shares its syntactic criteria with many other theorem-like structures. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.3) | |
A reaction: I think I was pretty convinced that a scientific theory had to meet more than mere syntactic criteria, before I encountered this idea. Lewis's account of laws may have to face this objection. |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Whatever simplicity criterion is chosen for theories, it can at best sort out strata of explanations of equal simplicity, each stratum containing infinitely many items. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
A reaction: [They cite Katz 1962 for this] This sounds to me like a purely technical result, where pragmatics would narrow the plausible theories right down. The 'Paradox of Clavius' is behind the idea (with an infinity of possible middle terms). |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The marvellous success in science of the powers/natures formula as a guide to research naturally leads to an attempt at a universal application of such a powerful schema. The electric and magnetic and gravitational fields are known by their powers. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
A reaction: This is a wonderfully heroic, and accurate, opposition to the prevailing accounts of science when they wrote. The laws, processes and equations of science and just part of a description of the natures and basic powers of what exists. |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: There are competitive models of the nature of things and materials, and that one is chosen which is successful in explaining the most powers and capacities of particulars and in leading to the discovery of hitherto unsuspected powers and capacities. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.III) | |
A reaction: If the powers and capacities are what get explained, what exactly does the explaining? If you says 'essences', you then have to characterise essences in some other way. I vote for basic powers as primitive. - but Idea 15302. |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The task of natural science is to investigate the nature of a thing or substance, and to test hypotheses as to the constitution of that thing or substance. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to suggest that science is only concerned with the very small, but it would include facts such as the dramatic change of a lump of uranium when it grows bigger. |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: 'Going together' is irrelevant as an explanation, and that is precisely why it is useless as a reason for having confidence in inductive inferences. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the deep underlying question is whether the actual world has modal features - that is, are dispositions, rather than mere categorical properties, a feature of the actual. Is this room full of possibilities? Yes, say I. |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The atomicity of Humean events ensures the sequential independence of properties, ...and this in turn leads to the Humean problem of induction. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as pretty good analysis of what has gone wrong with the Humean account. As far as I can see, the 'problem' of induction just doesn't occur in scientific essentialism. |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The question about Hempel's Paradox is whether contraposition is not only equivalent in truth, but equivalent tout court. It forcibly inserts new predicates into a context of properties known to be connected by nature. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems to capture quite nicely the intuition most people have (which makes it a 'paradox') that the equivalent predicate is irrelevant to the immediate enquiry. The paradox is good because it forces the present explanation. |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: If empirical predicates are linked in clusters, contraposition of (black, raven) would carry one via such pairs as (shoe, white) into a different empirical cluster, or no cluster at all. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.I) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, addressed to Hempel's Raven Paradox. Those paradoxes now strike me as relics of a time when Humean empiricism and logic were thought to be the best approaches to scientific theory. Harré and Madden pioneered a better view. |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The generating mechanism that produces black raven-like beings is assumed in the according of potential law status to the statement that all ravens are black. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.III) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice succinct statement of what I take to be the scientific essentialist view of induction. It isn't about building up Humean habits of regularity, but of gradually inferring explanatory mechanisms, which might even give necessities. |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Only changes require explanation. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.I) | |
A reaction: This points to powers as the fundamentals of all explanations, whereas if stasis also has to be explained then structures and matter have to be explained. Why is there something rather than nothing? No explanations allowed! |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Natural necessity involves causal directionality as an essential element, while entailment as a purely logical relation does not. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
A reaction: If there is a naturally necessary relation between an eclipse and its cause, the directionality of that doesn't seem to arise from the mutual relation between the two. You have to add time's arrow, or causation's arrow. |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The concept of power can be used to explain the temporal directionality of the concept of causality, and, at the same time, makes that causality a genuine case of natural necessity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that powers actually 'explain' causal direction. It seems more like transferring the directionality from the process to its source. You are still left with brute directionality. |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: In explaining a phenomenon one can cite the causes of that phenomenon; or one can set the phenomenon in a general theoretical framework. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 4.1) | |
A reaction: The thing is, you need to root an explanation in something taken as basic, and theoretical frameworks need further explanation, whereas causes seem to be basic. |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for the messy and complicated phenomenological laws that are true of it. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This summarises the core of her view in this book. She is after models rather than laws, and the models are based on causes. |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: The covering-law account supposes that there is, in principle, one 'right' explanation for each phenomenon. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably the law is held to be 'right', but there must be a bit of flexibility in describing the initial conditions, and the explanandum itself. |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: We explain by ceteris paribus laws, by composition of causes, and by approximations that improve on what the fundamental laws dictate. In all of these cases the fundamental laws patently do not get the facts right. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: It is rather headline-grabbing to say in this case that laws do not get the facts right. If they were actually 'wrong' and 'lied', there wouldn't be much point in building explanations on them. |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: When different kinds of causes compose, we want to explain what happens in the intersection of different domains. But the laws we use are designed only to tell truly what happens in each domain separately. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Since presumably the laws are discovered through experiments which try to separate out a single domain, in those circumstances they actually are true, so they don't 'lie'. |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Much criticism of the original covering-law model objects that it lets in too much. It seems we can explain Henry's failure to get pregnant by his taking birth control pills, and we can explain the storm by the falling barometer. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.0) | |
A reaction: I take these examples to show that true explanations must be largely causal in character. The physicality of causation is what matters, not 'laws'. I'd say the same of attempts to account for causation through counterfactuals. |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the extreme, that there is a law to cover every case. I do not. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The problem of coincidence is somewhere at the back of this thought. Innumerable events have their own explanations, but it is hard to explain their coincidence (see Aristotle's case of bumping into a friend in the market). |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: 'Why does that quail in the garden bob its head up and down in that funny way whenever it walks?' 'Because they all do'. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.5) | |
A reaction: She cites this as an old complaint against the covering-law model of explanation. It captures beautifully the basic error of the approach. We want to know 'why', rather than just have a description of the pattern. 'They all do' is useful information. |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: If we see that certain powers and capacities are explained by the nature of certain particulars and are necessarily attendant upon them, then we have an explanation of why certain things must go together and happen as they do. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I) | |
A reaction: They are offering this as an account of induction, as well as of explanation, and it is a nice summary of the account which I take to be correct. |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Usually in science the powers/natures formula does lead to the imagining of hypothetical mechanisms which might be discovered to be real. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III) | |
A reaction: The underlying mechanism is what I take Aristotle to have proposed, and it is the instinctive explanation by children (charted by Susan Gelman). |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Solidity is the effect of a power of repulsion between whole things, and shape is the effect of a power of attraction between parts of whole things. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.II.B) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit too neat in its division, but it shows nicely how a metaphysics with powers can deal with categorical properties. The question, remains, though of what is doing the repelling and attracting. Fields, they say. |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Capacities just as much as powers, what particulars and substances are liable to undergo as well as what they are able to do, are explained by reference to what the thing is in itself. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.C) | |
A reaction: This is an important warning against trying to give the whole account in terms of powers - unless the capacities and structures and categorical properties can also be explained in terms of the basic powers. |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There are a huge number of cases in the history of science where we now know our best explanations were false. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [She cites Laudan 1981 for this] The Ptolemaic system and aether are the standard example cited for this. I believe strongly in the importance of best explanation. Only a fool would just accept the best explanation available. Coherence is needed. |
14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source Aetius 4.4.6] |
6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
Full Idea: Epicurus says the soul is a blend of fiery stuff (for bodily warmth), airy stuff (rest), breath (motion), and a nameless stuff (sense-perception). | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.3.11 | |
A reaction: Obviously Epicurus thought the four stuffs were different combinations of atoms, rather than being elements. Is there no stuff which gives reason? Reason must reduce to motion, presumably. |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The concepts of power, capacity and the nature of a particular involve generalisations and hence already presuppose that there are grounds for extrapolation. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.V) | |
A reaction: I take sortal essentialism to be a serious misundertanding, but the mistake needs to be explained, and this idea is helpful towards that. I think the problem resides in the nature of the language we need to describe particulars. |
6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
Full Idea: By posing the problem of determinism, Epicurus became arguably the first philosopher to recognise the philosophical centrality of what we call the Free Will Question. His strongly libertarian approach is strongly contrasted with Stoic determinism. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary | |
A reaction: Epicurus introduced the rather dubious 'swerve' of the atoms to make room for free will. It seems to me more consistent to stick with the determinism of Democritus. Zeno became a determinist in reaction to Epicurus. |
20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
Full Idea: There is a free motion in the atoms, which Democritus did not discover, but which Epicurus brought to light, and which consists in a swerve, as he demonstrated on the basis of what is seen to be the case? | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - Wall inscription 54.II-III | |
A reaction: I presume the last bit means that we see that we have freedom of choice, and infer the swerve in the atoms as the only possible explanation. The worry for libertarians is, of course, who is in charge of the swerve. |
14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Necessity is a bad thing, but there is no necessity to live with necessity. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE], 9) |
1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If Epicurus makes the end consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure, or judgement of the good. | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.187 | |
A reaction: This is a nice statement of the mind-body problem. Ontologically, physics still seems to present reality as a 'heap of particles', which gives no basis for the emergence of anything as strange as consciousness. But then magnetism is pretty strange. |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: A statement which asserts that a substance or thing must manifest certain properties in order to be identified as a thing or substance of that sort can be laid down a priori. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.IV) | |
A reaction: This observation is encountered in Sidelle, but this is earlier, and seems to be the key to the Twin Earth thing. It is just convention whether we call XYZ water, or whether there are two sorts of jade or one. Science has prestige. |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: To attribute necessity to a condition, an outcome or effect, the truth of a statement, or a conclusion, is to indicate within the relevant context that no alternative is possible. In each context there are appropriate grounds for such judgements. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.V) | |
A reaction: This anticipipates Kit Fine's account of necessity by 25 years, and seems to be the right way to understand it. In ordinary usage, 'there is no alternative' is obvious a quite different claim in very different contexts. |
7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Epicurus was responsible for the innovatory recognition that the question of the will's freedom is central to ethics. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Compare Ideas 7672 and 6018. Obviously ethical action needs freedom, but the idea of a 'free will' is quite different. It is a fiction, created to give some sort of arrogant ultimate responsibility to our actions, like God. |
3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: I spit on the fine and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make any pleasure. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16 | |
A reaction: in Athenaeus |
1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the chief good, because all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended by pain by their natural instinct, without the employment of reason. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |
A reaction: The highest pleasure of predators is likely to be the killing of weaker animals. What all animals do isn't much of a criterion for the natural chief good. They also breathe. |
3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7 | |
A reaction: I don't recall any Greek ever spotting that boredom is a problem. But then they didn't have privacy, so other people always hold their attention. Maybe this is a dream of privacy. |
1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29 | |
A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering. |
1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08 | |
A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it. |
1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.35 |
1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.30 |
1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even if the wise man were put to the torture, he would still be happy. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.28 |
1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Even though he lose his eyes, a wise man should still partake of life. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.26 |
12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
Full Idea: Epicurus alone among the ancient schools denies that in nature we find any teleological explanations. Nothing in nature is for anything, neither the world as a whole nor anything in it. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction | |
A reaction: This may explain the controversial position that epicureanism held in the seventeenth century, as well as its incipient atheism. |
20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus said that the properties of the atoms are in number two, magnitude and shape, but Epicurus added to these a third one, weight. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.3.18 | |
A reaction: The addition of Epicurus seems very sensible, and an odd omission by Democritus. He seems to think that atoms have a uniform density, so that volume indicates weight. |
21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: The swerve of Epicurus takes place without a cause; it does not take place in consequence of being struck by another atom, since how can that take place if they are indivisible bodies travelling perpendicularly in straight lines by the force of gravity? | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.22 | |
A reaction: The swerve is the most ad hoc proposal in the history of theoretical physics. This is interesting for spelling out that the travel in vertical parallels. What's that all about, then? |
21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
Full Idea: What fresh cause exists in nature to make the atom swerve (or do the atoms cast lots among them which is to swerve and which not?), or to serve as the reason for making a very small swerve and not a large one, or one swerve, and not two or three swerves? | |
From: comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 20.46 | |
A reaction: This is an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which seems to be the main ground for rejecting the swerve. The only reason to accept the swerve is reluctance to accept determinism or fatalism. |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Natural necessity involves the concept of generative mechanisms and powerful particulars, and these in turn can be the basis of a useful notion of a natural kind. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
A reaction: Not sure about that. Say gold and silver are two kinds that lead to two outcomes. Each is a natural necessity. How do you distinguish them? Only by one being the gold-necessity and the other the silver-necessity. Circular? |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: We know from biology that naturally occurring species do not exhibit the constancy required by the concept of natural kind. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV) | |
A reaction: This view has been challenged recently. How much constancy does a natural kind need? Even protons decay eventually, it seems. I think a natural kind just needs a fair degree of stability over a reasonable time-period. Tigers qualify. |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The concept of cause may come to include the concepts of its usual effects. Concepts of this character are used in science, and in common language, to ascribe powers. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: See Theme 8|c|3 in Theme/Structure for more ideas about powers. It's hard to see how you could specify a cause at all if you weren't allowed to say what it does. I love powers, and want to make them the key idea in all of metaphysics. |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The Humean effort to ground the intuition of causal directionality on temporal priority of cause alone fails, because in fact some causes and effects are simultaneous. The moving of the knife and separation of the orange occur together. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: Since I take causation to be largely concerned with movements of 'energy', this idea that cause and effect might be simultaneous sounds more like a matter of pragmatics and convention. Moving the knife and moving the orange are different. |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The exercise of causal power is not a force or power that has some existence of its own but refers to forceful objects at work. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a behaviourist account of causation, which should make us a bit suspicious. Powers differ from one another. Does all causation have something universally in common? 'Energy' is a stab at the missing ingredient. |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Causation always involves a material particular which produces or generates something. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A) | |
A reaction: I agree with this. My bete noire is the idea that causation somehow results from laws or general truths. That gets the whole thing the wrong way round. This idea is based on the notion of 'powers'. |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Efficient causes comprise both the presence of stimuli which activate a quiescent individual, and the absence or removal of constraints upon an individual already in a state of activity. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.B) | |
A reaction: This is part of an account of causation in term of 'powers', with which I agree. Before you object, there is always going to be something about causation which is mind boggling weird, and probably leaves even God bewildered. |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: We can unambiguously differentiate the cause from the effect in that whatever stimulates or releases the action of the powerful particular involved in the causal production is the cause or part of the cause of that effect. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: I have doubts about distinguishing stimulus from release, and they sensibly don't say they have a test for 'the' cause, but I roughly agree with this idea. I take 'the' cause to also be tied in with explanation. |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: A cause ought to increase the frequency of the effect, but this fact may not show up in the probabilities if other causes are at work. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Patrick Suppes for this one] Presumably in experimental situations you can weed out the interference, but that threatens to eliminate mere 'probability' entirely. |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Nancy Cartwright distinguishes between 'fundamental explanatory laws', which we should not believe, and 'phenomenological laws', which are regularities established on the basis of observation. | |
From: report of Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4 | |
A reaction: The distinction is helpful, so that we can be clearer about what everyone is claiming. We can probably all agree on the phenomenological laws, which are epistemological. Personally I claim truth for the best fundamental explanatory laws. |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Philosophers distinguish phenomenological from theoretical laws. Phenomenological laws are about appearances; theoretical ones are about the reality behind the appearances. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm suspecting that Humeans only really believe in the phenomenological kind. I'm only interested in the theoretical kind, and I take inference to the best explanation to be the bridge between the two. Cartwright rejects the theoretical laws. |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to think that the principles that best organise will be true, nor that the principles that are true will organise much. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, as axiomatisations of the observed patterns in nature. |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The original Humean suggestion was that lawlike statements must contain only purely qualitative predicates - that is, predicates which do not require in a statement of their meaning a reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
A reaction: Harré and Madden are keen to promote particulars (with powers) as the foundation of scientific theory, and I agree with them. It strikes me as quite elementary that generalisations arise from particulars, so can't fundamentally explain them. |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of a formal analysis of the concept of lawlikeness has come to seem hopeless; every syntactical criterion proposed has a counter-example. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
A reaction: They seem unaware of Lewis's work in this area, which may be the most sophisticated attempt at a (Humean) attempt at formal analysis. Personally I see nothing in Lewis that would make them change their minds. |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Given some general theory specifying the fundamental causal powers and thereby laying down the general lineaments of a world, the necessity of certain effects can be inferred. They will be 'hypothetically necessary' (given those powers). | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.III.B) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty good statement of the core idea of necessity at the heart of scientific essentialism. Are we to call this 'natural' necessity or 'metaphysical' necessity? Presumably it is 'relative' necessity. Big implications for induction! |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Humeans say there can be no element of necessity in the causal relation because the conjunction of a description of a cause with the negation of a description of its usual effect is never self-contradictory. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I) | |
A reaction: We might say there actually is a contradiction, because you assert the existence of something, and then deny that existence by denying that the effect could occur. If the object is inert this is wrong, but if it is defined by its powers it is right. |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The only sure way of distinguishing lawful and accidental universal statements is to point out that in the former cases we see why the regularity must hold, while in the latter case we do not. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
A reaction: I agree with this, and also take it to be the solution to the problem of induction. That smoking causes cancer will be a true generalisation but not a law, until we see clearly why it happens. |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Where theories intersect, laws are usually hard to come by. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There are attempts at so-called 'bridge laws', to get from complex theories to simple ones, but her point is well made about theories on the same 'level'. |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: There is a case for calling a generalisation a law when its only confirmation is the multiplication of instances, if they don't conflict with other criteria. In fact any supported generalisation could count as a law if there is no counter-evidence. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern doubts about laws of nature, fully articulated in Mumford 2004. It seems to me inescapable that laws drop out if our ontology is based on powerful particulars. They are just patterns of outcome. |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To get from a detailed factual knowledge of a situation to an equation, we must prepare the description of the situation to meet the mathematical needs of the theory. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: She is clearly on to something here, as Galileo is blatantly wrong in his claim that the book of nature is written in mathematics. Mathematics is the best we can manage in getting a grip on the chaos. |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: For explanation simple laws must have the same form when they act together as when they act singly. ..But then what the law states cannot literally be true, for the consequences that occur if it acts alone are not what occurs when they act in combination. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.6) | |
A reaction: This is Cartwright's basic thesis. Her point is that the laws 'lie', because they claim to predict a particular outcome which never ever actually occurs. She says we could know all the laws, and still not be able to explain anything. |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: A moving thing is perceptually distinct from a motionless thing, but takes on no new quality. The perception of its motion is a genuine perception. Its motion is not inferred from observation of its successive occupations of different relative positions. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a response to Russell's reductive 'at-at' account of motion, which always struck me as wrong. It doesn't prove Russell wrong, of course, and they are trying to demonstrate that we perceive causation directly. |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: In the case of electron/positron/gamma ray annihilation scientists maintain the paradigm of rational explanation by inventing a quasi-substance as the bearer of continuity, and all three are seen in terms of 'energy'. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.III) | |
A reaction: What a relief to see energy described as a 'quasi-substance'. I spent all of my physics studies bewildered by the nature of energy (especially when described as 'pure energy'). What does e=mc^2 mean if e is a quasi-substance? |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The 'store' of kinetic energy is used as a latency concept to explain the power of bringing about changes which is manifested by the moving thing when its motion is arrested. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: These ideas have been most illuminating in connecting for me the general idea of a 'power' to the rather dubious concept of 'energy' in physics. |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Space lacks a place, and does not qualify as an individual, since the ordinary notion of individuals relates to place not space. ...But we can think of space as present in every place through the necessary connection between space and all places. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand it being present in every place, given that it is every place. |
14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: Stoics posited that time is an incorporeal which is conceived of all by itself, while Epicurus thinks that it is an accident of certain things, ...and he called in a property of properties. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.219-227] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The same electronic constitution confers two distinct powers upon chemical atoms: the power of entering only into certain chemical combinations and the power to radiate a particular spectrum. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 5.VI) | |
A reaction: Presumably radioactive elements emit other radiation. Do atoms have passive powers as well as active ones? |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Modern chemistry is not, as chemistry, purely structural. ...Thus CO2 is a different substance from SO2. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.II) | |
A reaction: I don't think I ever thought the chemistry was purely structural, but if you go in for the idea that reality is essentially geometrical (inspired by physics, presumably, like Ladyman) then you might make this mistake. |
2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: For Epicureans the gods are made of atoms, so in that case they are not eternal. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.68 |
2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Epicurus alone saw that gods must exist because nature herself has imprinted an idea of them in the minds of all mankind. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.43 |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Theism is supposedly a positive view that renders the world more intelligible than its alternatives, and this professed programme requires the production of results. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.VI) | |
A reaction: A nice articulation of a view of theism which will make believers wince, because Harré and Madden see it as a scientific theory, intended to explain the world. I'm with them. I see Plato's theory of Forms as a scientific theory. |
2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some believe that Epicurus gave lip-service only to the gods, so as not to offend the Athenians, but in fact did not believe in them. | |
From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.84 |
14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |
Full Idea: If god acted in accordance with the prayers of men, all men would rather quickly be destroyed, since they constantly pray for many sufferings to befall each other. | |
From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) | |
A reaction: [source Maximus the Abbott 'Gnom.' 14] |