47 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: Even a naturally gifted philosopher isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 485d) | |
A reaction: A serious charge against philosophy. An attraction of the subject is its purity, its necessity, its timelessness, and in some ways these are just nicer and easier and more understandable than the hard mess of real life. But understanding has to be good. |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: In the 'Gorgias' Socrates is still supremely confident that the elenchus is the final arbiter of moral truth. | |
From: comment on Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.117 |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
Full Idea: Test me, and let yourself be tested as well, by asking and answering questions. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 462a) | |
A reaction: The idea must be to avoid wild speculation, by continually filtering ideas through rival critical intelligences. The best philosophical method ever devised. |
16185 | Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Causality is a clue to what properties are real. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 9.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting variant on the Shoemaker proposal that properties actually are causal. I'm not sure that there is anything more to causality that the expression in action of properties, which I take to be powers. Structures are not properties. |
16182 | Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: In explaining a phenomenon one can cite the causes of that phenomenon; or one can set the phenomenon in a general theoretical framework. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 4.1) | |
A reaction: The thing is, you need to root an explanation in something taken as basic, and theoretical frameworks need further explanation, whereas causes seem to be basic. |
16184 | An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To explain a phenomenon is to find a model that fits it into the basic framework of the theory and that thus allows us to derive analogues for the messy and complicated phenomenological laws that are true of it. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 8.3) | |
A reaction: This summarises the core of her view in this book. She is after models rather than laws, and the models are based on causes. |
16171 | The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: The covering-law account supposes that there is, in principle, one 'right' explanation for each phenomenon. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably the law is held to be 'right', but there must be a bit of flexibility in describing the initial conditions, and the explanandum itself. |
16167 | Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: We explain by ceteris paribus laws, by composition of causes, and by approximations that improve on what the fundamental laws dictate. In all of these cases the fundamental laws patently do not get the facts right. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: It is rather headline-grabbing to say in this case that laws do not get the facts right. If they were actually 'wrong' and 'lied', there wouldn't be much point in building explanations on them. |
16169 | Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: When different kinds of causes compose, we want to explain what happens in the intersection of different domains. But the laws we use are designed only to tell truly what happens in each domain separately. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: Since presumably the laws are discovered through experiments which try to separate out a single domain, in those circumstances they actually are true, so they don't 'lie'. |
16176 | Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Much criticism of the original covering-law model objects that it lets in too much. It seems we can explain Henry's failure to get pregnant by his taking birth control pills, and we can explain the storm by the falling barometer. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.0) | |
A reaction: I take these examples to show that true explanations must be largely causal in character. The physicality of causation is what matters, not 'laws'. I'd say the same of attempts to account for causation through counterfactuals. |
16177 | I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the extreme, that there is a law to cover every case. I do not. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The problem of coincidence is somewhere at the back of this thought. Innumerable events have their own explanations, but it is hard to explain their coincidence (see Aristotle's case of bumping into a friend in the market). |
16180 | You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: 'Why does that quail in the garden bob its head up and down in that funny way whenever it walks?' …'Because they all do'. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.5) | |
A reaction: She cites this as an old complaint against the covering-law model of explanation. It captures beautifully the basic error of the approach. We want to know 'why', rather than just have a description of the pattern. 'They all do' is useful information. |
16183 | In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There are a huge number of cases in the history of science where we now know our best explanations were false. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 5.3) | |
A reaction: [She cites Laudan 1981 for this] The Ptolemaic system and aether are the standard example cited for this. I believe strongly in the importance of best explanation. Only a fool would just accept the best explanation available. Coherence is needed. |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
Full Idea: Rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people about right and wrong. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 455a) | |
A reaction: Surely there must be good rhetoric (or at least it is an open question)? |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
Full Idea: Rhetoric is a knack, because it lacks rational understanding of its object or what it dispenses (and can't explain the reason anything happens). | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 465a) | |
A reaction: If there are cunning people who have the wrong sort of intelligence for morality, there must be cunning users of rhetoric who know exactly what they are doing. |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
Full Idea: All activity aims at the good. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 499e) | |
A reaction: He includes non-conscious activity, so this is the 'teleological' view of nature, which seems a bit optimistic to the modern mind. |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: It's the weaklings who constitute the majority of the human race who make the rules. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483b) | |
A reaction: An aristocrat bemoans democracy. Presumably the qualification for being a 'weakling' is shortage of money. How strong are the scions of the aristocrats? |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
Full Idea: A good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfilment and happiness. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507c) | |
A reaction: Not how we would see it, I guess, but this is the Greek idea that a good person is one who functions well. Anyone who functions well is probably having a good time. |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: Nature says the only authentic way of life is to do nothing to hinder or restrain the expansion of one's desires. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 491e) | |
A reaction: Sounds like the natural desires of a young single man. Parents and spouses have natural desires that focus on other people's desires. |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
Full Idea: Good should be the goal of pleasant activities, rather than pleasure being the goal of good activities. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 500a) | |
A reaction: Nice. Not far off what Aristotle says on the topic. So what activities should we seek out? Narrow the pleasures down to the good ones, or narrow the good ones down to the pleasurable? |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
Full Idea: When we drink to quench thirst, we lose the distress of the thirst and the pleasure of drinking at the same moment, but one loss is good and the other bad, so the pleasure and the goodness must be separate. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 497d) | |
A reaction: This is open to the objection that the good of slaking one's thirst is a long-term pleasure, where the drinking is short-term, so pleasure is still the good. |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
Full Idea: There is little to tell between good and bad people (e.g. cowards) in terms of how much pleasure and distress they experience. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 498c) | |
A reaction: A very perceptive remark. If the good are people with empathy for others, then they may suffer more distress than the insensitive wicked. |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
Full Idea: In a fool's mind desire is a leaky jar, …which is an analogy for the mind's insatiability, showing we should prefer an orderly life, in which one is content with whatever is to hand, to a self-indulgent life of insatiable desire. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 493b) | |
A reaction: This points to an interesting paradox, that pleasure requires the misery of desire. And yet absence of desire is like death. An Aristotelian mean, of living according to nature, seems the escape route. |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: I want to ask whether a lifetime spent scratching, itching and scratching, no end of scratching, is also a life of happiness. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 494c) | |
A reaction: There are plenty of people who think 'fun' is the main aim of life, and who fit what Socrates is referring to. We don't admire such a life, but not many people can be admired. |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: If a person has the means to live a life of sensual, self-indulgent freedom, there's no better or happier state of existence. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492c) |
6012 | We must choose in which of the virtues we wish to excel [Panaetius] |
Full Idea: Humans have four roles in life, of which the fourth involves choices, of career, and of the virtue in which one wishes to excel. | |
From: Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]), quoted by Elizabeth Asmis - Panaetius | |
A reaction: Panaetius strikes me as exceptionally wise. A big gap in Aristotle is the fact that we cannot excel in all virtues, and that therefore some choice is required. By what criteria? We have the Gauguin problem (excel in one, disgraceful in the others). |
6013 | Panaetius said we should live according to our natural starting-points [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
Full Idea: Panaetius reformulated the Stoic goal as living in accordance with the starting-points given to us by nature. | |
From: report of Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]) by Elizabeth Asmis - Panaetius | |
A reaction: This sounds remarkably like the substitution of meritocratic equality of opportunity for communistic actual equality. In other words, it doesn't sound very Stoic. 'Live according to nature' implies more restraint than this ambitious version. |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: We should avoid doing wrong because of all the bad consequences it will bring us. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 480a) |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: If I had to choose between doing wrong and having wrong done to me, I'd prefer the latter to the former. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 469c) | |
A reaction: cf Democritus 68B45 |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: If people who need nothing are happy, there would be nothing happier than a stone or a corpse. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492e) | |
A reaction: We aren't really supposed to approve of Callicles, but to me this is a splendidly crushing western response to many of the ideals found in eastern philosophy. |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Self-indulgent desire makes a person incapable of co-operation, which is a prerequisite of friendship. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507e) |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: Why do most people praise self-discipline and justice? Because their own timidity makes them incapable of satisfying their pleasures. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 492a) |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
Full Idea: Socrates: A criminal is worse off if he doesn't pay the penalty, and continues to do wrong without getting punished. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 472e) |
6014 | Panaetius identified courage with great-mindedness, preferring civic courage to military [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
Full Idea: Panaetius recast the virtue of courage as 'greatmindedness' (Aristotle's paramount virtue), he demoted military valour and gave priority to courage displayed in civic life. | |
From: report of Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]) by Elizabeth Asmis - Panaetius | |
A reaction: I find this very appealing, as I am increasingly horrified by our denigration of the people who implement our democracy for us. We urgently need to get back to the Greek idea of civic virtue, and this idea of Panaetius should be widely promulgated. |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
Full Idea: I'm sure you know the list of human advantages in the party song: 'The very best is health, Second good looks, and third honest wealth'. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 451e) | |
A reaction: This invites the obvious question of why anyone wants these three things, with the implied answer of 'pleasure'. But we might want them even if we couldn't use them, implying pluralism. |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
Full Idea: As in every case (an artefact, a body, a mind, a creature), a good state is an organised and orderly state. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 506e) |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
Full Idea: The only responsibility of a good member of a community is altering the community's needs rather than going along with them. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 517b) |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: It's because most people are second-rate that they are happy for things to be distributed equally. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483c) |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Callicles: We only have to look at nature to find evidence that it is right for better to have a greater share than worse. | |
From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 483d) |
16175 | A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: A cause ought to increase the frequency of the effect, but this fact may not show up in the probabilities if other causes are at work. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Patrick Suppes for this one] Presumably in experimental situations you can weed out the interference, but that threatens to eliminate mere 'probability' entirely. |
6781 | There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Nancy Cartwright distinguishes between 'fundamental explanatory laws', which we should not believe, and 'phenomenological laws', which are regularities established on the basis of observation. | |
From: report of Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4 | |
A reaction: The distinction is helpful, so that we can be clearer about what everyone is claiming. We can probably all agree on the phenomenological laws, which are epistemological. Personally I claim truth for the best fundamental explanatory laws. |
16166 | Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Philosophers distinguish phenomenological from theoretical laws. Phenomenological laws are about appearances; theoretical ones are about the reality behind the appearances. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm suspecting that Humeans only really believe in the phenomenological kind. I'm only interested in the theoretical kind, and I take inference to the best explanation to be the bridge between the two. Cartwright rejects the theoretical laws. |
16179 | Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to think that the principles that best organise will be true, nor that the principles that are true will organise much. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, as axiomatisations of the observed patterns in nature. |
16178 | There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: Where theories intersect, laws are usually hard to come by. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There are attempts at so-called 'bridge laws', to get from complex theories to simple ones, but her point is well made about theories on the same 'level'. |
16170 | To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: To get from a detailed factual knowledge of a situation to an equation, we must prepare the description of the situation to meet the mathematical needs of the theory. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], Intro) | |
A reaction: She is clearly on to something here, as Galileo is blatantly wrong in his claim that the book of nature is written in mathematics. Mathematics is the best we can manage in getting a grip on the chaos. |
16181 | Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N] |
Full Idea: For explanation simple laws must have the same form when they act together as when they act singly. ..But then what the law states cannot literally be true, for the consequences that occur if it acts alone are not what occurs when they act in combination. | |
From: Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983], 3.6) | |
A reaction: This is Cartwright's basic thesis. Her point is that the laws 'lie', because they claim to predict a particular outcome which never ever actually occurs. She says we could know all the laws, and still not be able to explain anything. |
5888 | Souls are born, since they are sensitive and inherited, so they must perish [Panaetius, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Panaetius says that whatever is born must perish, and souls are clearly born, as shown by the resemblance of children to their parents in disposition as well as body; also, anything sensible of pain is susceptible to sickness, and hence perishes. | |
From: report of Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xxxii | |
A reaction: These seem to be rather good arguments. If we actually observe what someone's soul is like (through character) it seems rooted in a family and culture, and it certainly seems susceptible to disease. An empirical approach. |