6 ideas
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
Full Idea: Three main reasons for thinking properties exist: the one-over-many argument (that a type can have many tokens), the reference argument (to understand predicates and singular terms), and the quantification argument (that we quantify over them). | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Bits in brackets are compressions of his explanations]. I don't find any of these remotely persuasive. Why would we infer how the world is, simply from how we talk about or reason about the world? His first reason is the only interesting one. |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
Full Idea: The Quinean claims that the application of a predicate cannot, in principle, be explained - it is a 'primitive' fact. | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 4.4) | |
A reaction: I am not clear what 'principle' could endorse this claim. There just seems to be a possible failure of all the usual attempts at explaining predication. |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
Full Idea: For resemblance nominalism the sentence 'the rose is crimson' commits us to at least one other entity that the rose resembles in order for it to be crimson. | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.5.2) | |
A reaction: If the theory really needs this, then it has just sunk without trace. It can't suddenly cease to be crimson when the last resembling entity disappears. |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
Full Idea: The view of 'priority monism' - that the whole is prior to its parts - is controversial, but has been growing in support | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.4.4) | |
A reaction: The simple and plausible thought is, I take it, that parts only count as parts when a whole comes into existence, so a whole is needed to generate parts. Thus the whole must be prior to the parts. Fine by me. |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |
Full Idea: According to conceptual role semantics, the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, for example, in perception, thought and decision-making. | |
From: Ned Block (Semantics, Conceptual Role [1998]) | |
A reaction: I never believe theories of this kind, because I always find myself asking 'what is the nature of this representation which enables it to play this role?'. |