Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Languages of Art', 'Reference and Contingency' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
     Full Idea: The paradigmatic referring devices are singular terms, denoting particular items. In English these include proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and a few others.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: This list provides the agenda for twentieth century philosophy of language, since this is the point where language is supposed to hook onto the world.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
     Full Idea: Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
     A reaction: This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
     Full Idea: The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese).
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
     Full Idea: How could we know whether a sentence is verifiable unless we already knew what it says?
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 8)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a devastating objection to verificationism. Lycan suggests that you can formulate a preliminary meaning, without accepting true meaningfulness. Maybe verification just concerns truth, and not meaning.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Could I not know the use of an expression and fall in with it, mechanically, but without understanding it?
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: In a foreign country, you might successfully recite a long complex sentence, without understanding a single word. This doesn't doom the 'use' theory, but it means that quite a lot of detail needs to be filled in.
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Proper names pose a problem for the "use" theorist. Try stating a rule of use for the name 'William G. Lycan'.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: Presumably it is normally used in connection with a particular human being, and is typically the subject of a grammatical sentence. Any piece of language could also be used to, say, attract someone's attention.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
     Full Idea: A Davidsonian truth theory will not be able to distinguish the meaning of a sentence containing 'renate' from that of one containing 'cordate'.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: One might achieve the distinction by referring to truth conditions in possible worlds, if there are possible worlds where some cordates are not renate. See Idea 7773.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
     Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions can be taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: Presumably the meaning can't be complete possible worlds, so this must be a supplement to the normal truth conditions view proposed by Davidson. It particularly addresses the problem seen in Idea 7770.
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
     Full Idea: The possible worlds construal affords an elegant algebra of meaning by way of set theory: e.g. entailment between sentences is just the subset relation - S1 entails S2 if S2 is true in any world in which S1 is true.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10)
     A reaction: We might want to separate the meanings of sentences from their entailments (though Brandom links them, see Idea 7765).
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner]
     Full Idea: In Goodman's account, knowing what a painting represents is logically like understanding a sentence in a natural language. It requires a grasp of the 'symbol system' to which the painting belongs.
     From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Languages of Art [1976]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 2.3.2
     A reaction: This may fit some pictures well (e.g. early Flemish painting, with its complex iconography), but others hardly at all. You can enjoy a first experience of (say) ballet long before you get the hang of the 'symbol system' involved.