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All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Philosophy of Science' and 'Essence and Accident'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
     Full Idea: We can have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.3)
     A reaction: Goodman seems to have a particularly extreme version of the commitment to philosophy as linguistic. Non-human animals have no world, it seems.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Truth pertains solely to what is said ...For nonverbal versions and even for verbal versions without statements, truth is irrelevant.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.5)
     A reaction: Goodman is a philosopher of language (like Dummett), but I am a philosopher of thought (like Evans). The test, for me, is whether truth is applicable to the thought of non-human animals. I take it to be obvious that it is applicable.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Nothing is primitive or derivationally prior to anything apart from a constructional system.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4c)
     A reaction: Something may be primitive not just because we can't be bothered to analyse it any further, but because even God couldn't analyse it. Maybe.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Recognising patterns is very much a matter of inventing or imposing them.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7)
     A reaction: I take this to be false.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Reality in a world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.6)
     A reaction: I'm a robust realist, me, but I sort of see what he means. We become steeped in unspoken conventions about how we take our world to be, and filter out anything that conflicts with it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
     Full Idea: We dismiss as illusory or negligible what cannot be fitted into the architecture of the world we are building.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d)
     A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example of this, but can't. Maybe poor people are invisible to the rich?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
     Full Idea: A world may be unmanageably heterogeneous or unbearably monotonous according to how events are sorted into kinds.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a)
     A reaction: We might expect this from the man who invented 'grue', which allows you to classify things that change colour with things that don't. Could you describe a bird as 'might have been a fish', and classify it with fish? ('Projectible'?)
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
     Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties.
     From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718)
     A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
     Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent.
     From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2
     A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
     Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences.
     From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716)
     A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
     Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object.
     From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8)
     A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Identification rests upon organization into entities and kinds. The response to the question 'Same or not the same?' must always be 'Same what?'. ...Identity or constancy in a world is identity with respect to what is within that world as organised.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a)
     A reaction: And the gist of his book is that 'organised' is done by us, not by the world. He seems to be committed to the full Geachean relative identity, rather than the mere Wigginsian relative individuation. An unfashionable view!
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Discovery often amounts, as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a fit.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7)
     A reaction: I find Goodman's views here pretty alien, but I like this bit. Coherence really rocks.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
     Full Idea: There is no sense in abandoning a successful theory if you have nothing to replace it with.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 2)
     A reaction: This is also a problem for infererence to the best explanation. What to do if your best explanation is not very good? The simple message is do not rush to dump a theory when faced with an anomaly.
If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3)
     A reaction: [On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Is Newton's theory simpler than Einstein's, since there is only one relation of simultaneity in absolute time, or is Einstein's simpler because it dispenses with absolute time altogether?
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: A nice question, to which a good scientist might be willing to offer an answer. Since simultaneity is crucial but the existence of time is not, I would vote for Newton as the simpler.
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Structural Realists say that modern science achieves a true or 'truer' account of the world only with respect to its mathematical structure rather than its intrinsic qualities or nature. The structure carries over to new theories.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: At first glance I am unconvinced that when an old theory is replaced it neverthess contains some sort of 'mathematical structure' which endures and is worth preserving. No doubt Worrall, French and co have examples.
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Structural Realists must show that it is the mathematical aspects of the theories, not their content, that account for their success ….and that their structure and content can be clearly separated.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Their approach certainly seems to rely on mathematical types of science, so it presumably fits biology, geology and even astronomy less well.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
     Full Idea: To use a digital thermometer with readings in tenths of a degree is to recognise no temperature as lying between 90 and 90.1 degrees.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d)
     A reaction: This appears to be nonsense, treating users of digital thermometers as if they were stupid. No one thinks temperatures go up and down in quantum leaps. We all know there is a gap between instrument and world. (Very American, I'm thinking!)
For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The main difficulty with instrumentalism is its implausible account ot the meaning of theoretical claims and concepts. Most scientists take them to be straightforward attempts to describe the world. Most say they are useful because they are accurate.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Instrumentalism is seen as a Pragmatist view, and Dewey is cited.
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
     Full Idea: We have no neat frames of reference, no ready rules for transforming physics, biology and psychology into one another.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2)
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Grue cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4b)
     A reaction: This may make 'grue' less mad than I thought it was. I always assume we are slicing the world as 'green, blue and grue'. I still say 'green' is a basic predicate of experience, but 'grue' is amenable to analysis.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
     Full Idea: The more unification and integration is found among the modern sciences, the less likely it seems it will have all been a dream.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: I believe this strongly. Ancient theories which were complex, wide ranging and false do not impress me. This is part of my coherence view of justification.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
     Full Idea: If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one. One world may be taken as many, or many worlds taken as one; whether one or many depends on the way of taking.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2)
     A reaction: He cites 'The Pluralistic Universe' by William James for this idea. The idea is that the distinction 'evaporates under analysis'. Parmenides seems to have thought that no features could be distinguished in the true One.
Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian physics assumed that celestial motion is naturally circular and eternal while terrestrial motion is naturally toward the center of the earth and final.
     From: Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
     A reaction: The overthrow of this by Galileo and then Newton may have been the most dramatic revolution of the new science. It opened up the possibility of universal laws of physics.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
     Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal.
     From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715)
     A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
     Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge.
     From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717)
     A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals.