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All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Philosophy of Logic' and 'Subjective and Objective'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
     Full Idea: We can have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.3)
     A reaction: Goodman seems to have a particularly extreme version of the commitment to philosophy as linguistic. Non-human animals have no world, it seems.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Truth pertains solely to what is said ...For nonverbal versions and even for verbal versions without statements, truth is irrelevant.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.5)
     A reaction: Goodman is a philosopher of language (like Dummett), but I am a philosopher of thought (like Evans). The test, for me, is whether truth is applicable to the thought of non-human animals. I take it to be obvious that it is applicable.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
     Full Idea: For a language L there is a predicate 'true-in-L' which one can employ for all scientific purposes in place of intuitive truth, and this predicate admits of a precise definition using only the vocabulary of L itself plus set theory.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.2)
     A reaction: He refers, of course, to Tarski's theory. I'm unclear of the division between 'scientific purposes' and the rest of life (which is why some people embrace 'minimal' theories of ordinary truth). I'm struck by set theory being a necessary feature.
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
     Full Idea: In modern notation we can consider potential logical principles that Aristotle never considered because of his general practice of looking at inferences each of whose premises involved exactly two class-names.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Presumably you can build up complex inferences from a pair of terms, just as you do with pairs in set theory.
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
     Full Idea: On its modern interpretation, the validity of the inference 'All S are M; All M are P; so All S are P' just expresses the transitivity of the relation 'subclass of'.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.1)
     A reaction: A simple point I've never quite grasped. Since lots of syllogisms can be expressed as Venn Diagrams, in which the circles are just sets, it's kind of obvious really. So why does Sommers go back to 'terms'? See 'Term Logic'.
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
'⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The symbol '⊃' (read 'if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' ('if Px then Qx') is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)'.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3)
     A reaction: So ⊃ and → are just abbreviations, and not really a proper part of the language. Notoriously, though, this is quite a long way from what 'if...then' means in ordinary English, and it leads to paradoxical oddities.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
     Full Idea: In the theory of types, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type, where individuals count as the zero type, sets of individuals as type one, sets of sets of individuals as type two.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.6)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
     Full Idea: It was essentially the failure to develop a logic of relations that trivialised the logic studied before the end of the nineteenth century.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3)
     A reaction: De Morgan, Peirce and Frege were, I believe, the people who put this right.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The natural understanding of first-order logic is that in writing down first-order schemata we are implicitly asserting their validity, that is, making second-order assertions. ...Thus even quantification theory involves reference to classes.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3)
     A reaction: If, as a nominalist, you totally rejected classes, presumably you would get by in first-order logic somehow. To say 'there are no classes so there is no logical validity' sounds bonkers.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Today, the tendency among philosophers is to assume that in no sense does logic itself have an empirical foundation. I believe this tendency is wrong.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.9)
     A reaction: I agree, not on the basis of indispensability to science, but on the basis of psychological processes that lead from experience to logic. Russell and Quine are Putnam's allies here, and Frege is his opponent. Putnam developed a quantum logic.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Instead of identifying functions with certain sets, I might have identified sets with certain functions.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.9)
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
     Full Idea: I don't think all substitution-instances of a valid schema are 'true'; some are clearly meaningless, such as 'If all boojums are snarks and all snarks are egglehumphs, then all boojums are egglehumphs'.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This seems like a very good challenge to Quine's claim that it is only form which produces a logical truth. Keep deductive and semantic consequence separate, with two different types of 'logical truth'.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Sets of a very high type or very high cardinality (higher than the continuum, for example) should today be investigated in an 'if-then' spirit.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This attitude goes back to Hilbert, but it fits with Quine's view of what is indispensable for science. It is hard to see a reason for the cut-off, just looking at the logic of expanding sets.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Nothing is primitive or derivationally prior to anything apart from a constructional system.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4c)
     A reaction: Something may be primitive not just because we can't be bothered to analyse it any further, but because even God couldn't analyse it. Maybe.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Recognising patterns is very much a matter of inventing or imposing them.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7)
     A reaction: I take this to be false.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Reality in a world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.6)
     A reaction: I'm a robust realist, me, but I sort of see what he means. We become steeped in unspoken conventions about how we take our world to be, and filter out anything that conflicts with it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
     Full Idea: We dismiss as illusory or negligible what cannot be fitted into the architecture of the world we are building.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d)
     A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example of this, but can't. Maybe poor people are invisible to the rich?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
     Full Idea: A world may be unmanageably heterogeneous or unbearably monotonous according to how events are sorted into kinds.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a)
     A reaction: We might expect this from the man who invented 'grue', which allows you to classify things that change colour with things that don't. Could you describe a bird as 'might have been a fish', and classify it with fish? ('Projectible'?)
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Nominalists must at heart be materialists, or so it seems to me: otherwise their scruples are unintelligible.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is modern nominalism - the rejection of abstract objects. I largely plead guilty to both charges.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Physics is full of references to such 'non-physical' entities as state-vectors, Hamiltonians, Hilbert space etc.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.2)
     A reaction: I take these to be concepts which are 'abstracted' from the physical facts, and so they don't strike me as being much of an ontological problem, or an objection to nominalism (which Putnam takes them to be).
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Identification rests upon organization into entities and kinds. The response to the question 'Same or not the same?' must always be 'Same what?'. ...Identity or constancy in a world is identity with respect to what is within that world as organised.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a)
     A reaction: And the gist of his book is that 'organised' is done by us, not by the world. He seems to be committed to the full Geachean relative identity, rather than the mere Wigginsian relative individuation. An unfashionable view!
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The private object or sense datum view is an instance of the false objectification of what is essentially subjective.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.207)
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Discovery often amounts, as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a fit.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7)
     A reaction: I find Goodman's views here pretty alien, but I like this bit. Coherence really rocks.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Scientists want successful predictions in order to confirm their theories; they do not want theories in order to obtain the predictions, which are in some cases of not the slightest interest in themselves.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Equally, we might only care about the prediction, and have no interest at all in the theory. Farmers want weather predictions, not a PhD in meteorology.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
     Full Idea: To use a digital thermometer with readings in tenths of a degree is to recognise no temperature as lying between 90 and 90.1 degrees.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d)
     A reaction: This appears to be nonsense, treating users of digital thermometers as if they were stupid. No one thinks temperatures go up and down in quantum leaps. We all know there is a gap between instrument and world. (Very American, I'm thinking!)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
     Full Idea: We have no neat frames of reference, no ready rules for transforming physics, biology and psychology into one another.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2)
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Grue cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4b)
     A reaction: This may make 'grue' less mad than I thought it was. I always assume we are slicing the world as 'green, blue and grue'. I still say 'green' is a basic predicate of experience, but 'grue' is amenable to analysis.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The problem of reconciling the objective and subjective points of view takes its purest form in a sense of incredulity that one should be anyone in particular.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.206)
     A reaction: Nice observation. This idea has always struck me forcibly, and seems to be one of those basic intuitions which motivates philosophy, and yet the subject has almost nothing to say about it. Of course you are you, or you wouldn't be amazed by it…
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The metaphysical ego, if it is a continuing individual with its identity over time, is just one more thing about which the same problem can be raised - will that ego still be me?
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.200)
     A reaction: You can worry too much about some philosophical questions. If it is me now, and it has continuing individual identity over time, I'm not going to lose sleep over the possibility that it might nevertheless somehow cease to be me. I'm overrated.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.198)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realisation of what is best 'sub specie aeternitatis'.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.204)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
     Full Idea: If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one. One world may be taken as many, or many worlds taken as one; whether one or many depends on the way of taking.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2)
     A reaction: He cites 'The Pluralistic Universe' by William James for this idea. The idea is that the distinction 'evaporates under analysis'. Parmenides seems to have thought that no features could be distinguished in the true One.