22 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We can have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Goodman seems to have a particularly extreme version of the commitment to philosophy as linguistic. Non-human animals have no world, it seems. |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Truth pertains solely to what is said ...For nonverbal versions and even for verbal versions without statements, truth is irrelevant. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Goodman is a philosopher of language (like Dummett), but I am a philosopher of thought (like Evans). The test, for me, is whether truth is applicable to the thought of non-human animals. I take it to be obvious that it is applicable. |
13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: There are four 'perfect syllogisms': Barbara (every M is P, every S is M, so every S is P); Celarent (no M is P, every S is M, so no S is P); Darii (every M is P, some S is M, so some S is P); Ferio (no M is P, some S is M, so some S is not P). | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: The four names are mnemonics from medieval universities. |
13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: It has often been claimed (e.g. by Leibniz) that a single rule governs all syllogistic validity, called 'dictum de omni et null', which says that what is affirmed or denied of any whole is affirmed or denied of any part of that whole. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the rule which is captured by Venn Diagrams. |
13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: Three common kinds of sentence cannot be put into syllogistic ('categorical') form: ones using singular terms ('Mars is red'), ones using relational terms ('every painter owns some brushes'), and compound sentences. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8) |
13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: Term logic begins with expressions and two 'term functors'. Any simple letter is a 'term', any term prefixed by a minus ('-') is a 'negative term', and any pair of terms flanking a plus ('+') is a 'compound term'. Parenthese are used for grouping. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 8) | |
A reaction: [see Engelbretsen and Sayward for the full formal system] |
13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: One of the key ideas of modern formal logic is that all formally valid inferences can be specified in strictly syntactic terms. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Ch.2) |
13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: Classical logic rests on the concepts of truth and falsity (and usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models), whereas constructivist logic accounts for inference in terms of defense and refutation. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: My instincts go with the classical view, which is that inferences do not depend on the human capacity to defend them, but sit there awaiting revelation. My view isn't platonist, because I take the inferences to be rooted in the physical world. |
13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: Unlike ∨, →, ↔, and ∀, the sign = is not eliminable from a logic. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], Ch.3) |
13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
Full Idea: A set of axioms is said to be ω-incomplete if, for some universal quantification, each of its instances is derivable from those axioms but the quantification is not thus derivable. | |
From: Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C (Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics [2011], 7) |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Nothing is primitive or derivationally prior to anything apart from a constructional system. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4c) | |
A reaction: Something may be primitive not just because we can't be bothered to analyse it any further, but because even God couldn't analyse it. Maybe. |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Recognising patterns is very much a matter of inventing or imposing them. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7) | |
A reaction: I take this to be false. |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Reality in a world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I'm a robust realist, me, but I sort of see what he means. We become steeped in unspoken conventions about how we take our world to be, and filter out anything that conflicts with it. |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We dismiss as illusory or negligible what cannot be fitted into the architecture of the world we are building. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d) | |
A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example of this, but can't. Maybe poor people are invisible to the rich? |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
Full Idea: A world may be unmanageably heterogeneous or unbearably monotonous according to how events are sorted into kinds. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a) | |
A reaction: We might expect this from the man who invented 'grue', which allows you to classify things that change colour with things that don't. Could you describe a bird as 'might have been a fish', and classify it with fish? ('Projectible'?) |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Identification rests upon organization into entities and kinds. The response to the question 'Same or not the same?' must always be 'Same what?'. ...Identity or constancy in a world is identity with respect to what is within that world as organised. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a) | |
A reaction: And the gist of his book is that 'organised' is done by us, not by the world. He seems to be committed to the full Geachean relative identity, rather than the mere Wigginsian relative individuation. An unfashionable view! |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Discovery often amounts, as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a fit. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7) | |
A reaction: I find Goodman's views here pretty alien, but I like this bit. Coherence really rocks. |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
Full Idea: To use a digital thermometer with readings in tenths of a degree is to recognise no temperature as lying between 90 and 90.1 degrees. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d) | |
A reaction: This appears to be nonsense, treating users of digital thermometers as if they were stupid. No one thinks temperatures go up and down in quantum leaps. We all know there is a gap between instrument and world. (Very American, I'm thinking!) |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We have no neat frames of reference, no ready rules for transforming physics, biology and psychology into one another. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2) |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Grue cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4b) | |
A reaction: This may make 'grue' less mad than I thought it was. I always assume we are slicing the world as 'green, blue and grue'. I still say 'green' is a basic predicate of experience, but 'grue' is amenable to analysis. |
22601 | Laissez-faire individualism doesn't work, especially in troublesome times [Keynes] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that an individualist society left to itself does not work well or even tolerably. The more troublesome the times, the worse does a laissez-faire system work. | |
From: Maynard Keynes (The General Theory of Employment [1936]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7 | |
A reaction: I thought I was a Communitarian, but I may be a Keynesian Liberal, committed to a safety net welfare system. I haven't quite decided yet. Political philosophy is hopeless, if the ideas actually have to be implemented. What is the criterion of 'work'? |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
Full Idea: If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one. One world may be taken as many, or many worlds taken as one; whether one or many depends on the way of taking. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2) | |
A reaction: He cites 'The Pluralistic Universe' by William James for this idea. The idea is that the distinction 'evaporates under analysis'. Parmenides seems to have thought that no features could be distinguished in the true One. |