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13985
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A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
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Full Idea:
Whereas there might be just one fact that a true proposition was like, we would have to say that a false proposition was unlike any fact. We could not speak of the fact that it was false of, so we could not speak of its being false of anything at all.
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From:
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections')
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A reaction:
Ryle brings out very nicely the point Russell emphasised so much, that the most illuminating studies in philosophy are of how falsehood works, rather than of how truths work. If I say 'the Queen is really a man' it is obvious what that is false of.
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13979
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Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
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Full Idea:
Logic studies the way in which one thing follows from another, in which one thing is compatible with another, contradicts, corroborates or necessitates another, is a special case of another or the nerve of another. And so on.
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From:
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)
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A reaction:
I presume that 'and so on' would include how one thing proves another. This is quite a nice list, which makes me think a little more widely about the nature of logic (rather than just about inference). Incompatibility isn't a process.
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13983
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Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
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Full Idea:
The theory of Representative Ideas begs the whole question, by assuming a) that we can know these 'Ideas', b) that we can know the realities they represent, and c) we can know a particular 'idea' to be representative of a particular reality.
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From:
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections')
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A reaction:
Personally I regard the ideas as immediate (rather than acquired by some knowledge process), and I am dimly hoping that they represent reality (or I'm in deep trouble), and I am struggling to piece together the reality they represent. I'm happy with that.
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13981
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Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
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Full Idea:
We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'.
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From:
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)
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A reaction:
Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion.
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13989
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There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
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Full Idea:
There are no substantial propositions...There is just a relation between grammatical structure and the logical structure of facts. 'Proposition' denotes the same as 'sentence' or 'statement'. A proposition is not what I think, but what I think or talk in.
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From:
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Conclusions')
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A reaction:
The conclusion of Ryle's discussion, but I found his support for propositions much more convincing than his critique of them, or his attempt at an alternative linguistic account. He never mentioned animals, so he self-evidently hasn't grasped the problem.
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13982
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If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
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Full Idea:
All the arguments for the subsistence of true propositions seem to hold good for the subsistence of false ones. We might even have to find room for absurd or nonsensical ones like 'some round squares are not red-headed'.
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From:
Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections')
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A reaction:
A particularly nice example of a Category Mistake from the man who made them famous. Why can't we just make belief a proposition attitude, so I equally believe 'sea is blue', 'grass is pink' and 'trees are bifocal', but the status of my belief varies?
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16589
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Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
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Full Idea:
Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
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From:
Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
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A reaction:
Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.
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16651
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God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
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Full Idea:
If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
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From:
Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
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A reaction:
How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.
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