6 ideas
| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances). | |
| From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers? |
| 21912 | Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB] |
| Full Idea: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were united in their opposition to Kant's Transcendental Idealism. | |
| From: Peter B. Lewis (Schopenhauer [2012], 3) | |
| A reaction: That is, they preferred genuine idealism, to the mere idealist attitude Kant felt that we are forced to adopt. |
| 21911 | Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB] |
| Full Idea: At the University of Jena, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling critically developed aspects of Kant's philosophy, each in his own way, thereby giving rise to the movement known as Absolute Idealism, see reality as universal God-like self-consciousness. | |
| From: Peter B. Lewis (Schopenhauer [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: Is asking how anyone can possibly have believed such a bizarre and ridiculous idea a) uneducated, b) stupid, c) unimaginative, or d) very sensible? It sounds awfully like Spinoza's concept of God. Also Anaxagoras. |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics. | |
| From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75) | |
| A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals. |
| 8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner] |
| Full Idea: In Goodman's account, knowing what a painting represents is logically like understanding a sentence in a natural language. It requires a grasp of the 'symbol system' to which the painting belongs. | |
| From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Languages of Art [1976]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 2.3.2 | |
| A reaction: This may fit some pictures well (e.g. early Flemish painting, with its complex iconography), but others hardly at all. You can enjoy a first experience of (say) ballet long before you get the hang of the 'symbol system' involved. |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes. | |
| From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92) | |
| A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them. |