29 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We can have words without a world but no world without words or other symbols. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Goodman seems to have a particularly extreme version of the commitment to philosophy as linguistic. Non-human animals have no world, it seems. |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Truth pertains solely to what is said ...For nonverbal versions and even for verbal versions without statements, truth is irrelevant. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Goodman is a philosopher of language (like Dummett), but I am a philosopher of thought (like Evans). The test, for me, is whether truth is applicable to the thought of non-human animals. I take it to be obvious that it is applicable. |
8628 | I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons] |
Full Idea: I hold that algebra is a highly developed logic, and number but logical discrimination. | |
From: William S. Jevons (The Principles of Science [1879], p.156), quoted by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §15 | |
A reaction: Thus Frege shows that logicism was an idea that was in the air before he started writing. Riemann's geometry and Boole's logic presumably had some influence here. |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Nothing is primitive or derivationally prior to anything apart from a constructional system. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4c) | |
A reaction: Something may be primitive not just because we can't be bothered to analyse it any further, but because even God couldn't analyse it. Maybe. |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Recognising patterns is very much a matter of inventing or imposing them. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7) | |
A reaction: I take this to be false. |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Reality in a world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I'm a robust realist, me, but I sort of see what he means. We become steeped in unspoken conventions about how we take our world to be, and filter out anything that conflicts with it. |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We dismiss as illusory or negligible what cannot be fitted into the architecture of the world we are building. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d) | |
A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example of this, but can't. Maybe poor people are invisible to the rich? |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
Full Idea: A world may be unmanageably heterogeneous or unbearably monotonous according to how events are sorted into kinds. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a) | |
A reaction: We might expect this from the man who invented 'grue', which allows you to classify things that change colour with things that don't. Could you describe a bird as 'might have been a fish', and classify it with fish? ('Projectible'?) |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Identification rests upon organization into entities and kinds. The response to the question 'Same or not the same?' must always be 'Same what?'. ...Identity or constancy in a world is identity with respect to what is within that world as organised. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4a) | |
A reaction: And the gist of his book is that 'organised' is done by us, not by the world. He seems to be committed to the full Geachean relative identity, rather than the mere Wigginsian relative individuation. An unfashionable view! |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Discovery often amounts, as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a fit. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.7) | |
A reaction: I find Goodman's views here pretty alien, but I like this bit. Coherence really rocks. |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
Full Idea: To use a digital thermometer with readings in tenths of a degree is to recognise no temperature as lying between 90 and 90.1 degrees. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4d) | |
A reaction: This appears to be nonsense, treating users of digital thermometers as if they were stupid. No one thinks temperatures go up and down in quantum leaps. We all know there is a gap between instrument and world. (Very American, I'm thinking!) |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
Full Idea: We have no neat frames of reference, no ready rules for transforming physics, biology and psychology into one another. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2) |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
Full Idea: Grue cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4b) | |
A reaction: This may make 'grue' less mad than I thought it was. I always assume we are slicing the world as 'green, blue and grue'. I still say 'green' is a basic predicate of experience, but 'grue' is amenable to analysis. |
22673 | Wherever there is a small community, the association of the people is natural [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly natural that, wherever a number of men are collected, it seems to constitute itself. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.04) | |
A reaction: Seems like a chicken and egg issue. I would have thought that association precedes the development of a village. |
22676 | The people are just individuals, and only present themselves as united to foreigners [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The people in themselves are only individuals; and the special reason why they need to be united under one government is that they may appear to advantage before foreigners. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an observation on 1830s America, rather than a universal truth. It fits modern western societies rather well though. |
22679 | Vast empires are bad for well-being and freedom, though they may promote glory [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more opposed to the well-being and the freedom of men than vast empires. …But there is a love of glory in those who regard the applause of a great people as a worthy reward. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: Presumably the main the problem is the central dominance over distant colonies. There may also be some freedom in being distant from the centres, especially in 1830. The Wild West. |
22680 | People would be much happier and freer in small nations [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: If none but small nations existed, I do not doubt that mankind would be more happy and more free. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: In modern times many small states have appeared in Europe (in the Balkans and on the Baltic), and it looks to me a good thing. The prospect of Scottish independence may currently be looming, and De Tocqueville would approve. |
22675 | In American judges rule according to the Constitution, not the law [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution, rather than on the laws. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.05) | |
A reaction: Obviously the Constitution is one short document, so the details must be enshrined in the laws (which presumably defer to the Constitution). |
22677 | A monarchical family is always deeply concerned with the interests of the state [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The advantages of a monarchy are that the private interests of a family are connected with the interests of the state, …and at least there is always someone available to conduct the affairs of a monarchy. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: The second one is not much of a reason! The same defence can be given for the dominance of the Mafia. His defences are deliberately feeble, I suspect. England had plenty of monarchs who showed limited interest. |
22683 | Despots like to see their own regulations ignored, by themselves and their agents [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: In despotic states the sovereign is so much attached to his power that he dislikes the constraints even of his own regulations, and likes to see his agents acting irregularly. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.11) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. What would Machiavelli say? At least the citizens can see where the real power resides. |
22669 | Aristocracy is constituted by inherited landed property [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Land is the basis of an aristocracy; …it is by landed property handed down from generation to generation that an aristocracy is constituted. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.01) | |
A reaction: Presumably there can be aristocrats by mere royal patronage, who have perhaps gambled away their land. They need protection by the other aristocrats. |
22674 | In Europe it is thought that local government is best handled centrally [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The partisans of centralisation in Europe are wont to maintain that the government can administer the affairs of each locality better than the citizens can do it for themselves. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.04) | |
A reaction: In the modern UK we have lots of local government, which is thoroughly starved of funds by the central government. He is contrasting it with the strong local system in the U.S. |
22678 | An election, and its lead up time, are always a national crisis [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The period which immediately precedes an election, and that during which the election is taking place, must always be considered as a national crisis. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: Rousseau said something similar. Election day in modern Britain is very peaceful and civilised, but it used to be chaotic. The weeks preceding it are invariably nasty. |
22682 | Universal suffrage is no guarantee of wise choices [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Universal suffrage is by no means a guarantee of the wisdom of the popular choice. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.11) | |
A reaction: This was precisely Plato's fear about democracy. There seems no way at all of preventing the people from electing representatives on superficial grounds of personality. |
22670 | Slavery undermines the morals and energy of a society [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Slavery dishonours labour; it introduces idleness into society, and with idleness, ignorance and pride, luxury and distress. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.01) | |
A reaction: A pretty feeble reason (in the 1830s) for disliking slavery. He seems only concerned with the adverse effects on the slave-owning society, and shows no interest in the slaves themselves. |
22681 | The liberty of the press is more valuable for what it prevents than what it promotes [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: I approve of the liberty of the press from a consideration more of the evils it prevents than of the advantages it ensures. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.10) | |
A reaction: He accepts the freedom of the press as inevitable in a democracy, but he found U.S. newspapers to be nearly as bad then as they are now. |
22672 | It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: One manly and lawful passion for equality elevates the humble to the rank of the great. But there exists also a depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
A reaction: There is a distinction in modern political rhetoric between 'levelling down' and 'levelling up'. Since levelling down is just destructive, and levelling up is unaffordable, it seems obvious that true equality needs to be a compromise. |
22671 | Equality can only be established by equal rights for all (or no rights for anyone) [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: I know of only two methods of establishing equality in the political world; rights must be given to every citizen, or none at all to anyone. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
A reaction: We may have a vague concept of 'natural' rights, but primarily they are a tool of social engineering. You could grant equal rights on inheritance, for example, which turn out in practice to hugely favour the rich. |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
Full Idea: If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects; if there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one. One world may be taken as many, or many worlds taken as one; whether one or many depends on the way of taking. | |
From: Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.2) | |
A reaction: He cites 'The Pluralistic Universe' by William James for this idea. The idea is that the distinction 'evaporates under analysis'. Parmenides seems to have thought that no features could be distinguished in the true One. |