Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'On 'Generation and Corruption'' and 'Personal Identity and Memory'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7566 The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
16718 Primary qualities are the cause of all the other sensible qualities [Albertus Magnus]
     Full Idea: The primary qualities of tangible things are the cause of all the other sensible qualities.
     From: Albertus Magnus (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1261], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
     A reaction: This makes the primary qualities sound suspiciously like the essence.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
1389 If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves.
     From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4)
     A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma.
1390 Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
     Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria.
     From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible?