Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Truth-making without Truth-makers' and 'What Metaphors Mean'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
There are 'conceptual' explanations, with their direction depending on complexity [Schnieder]
     Full Idea: The direction of conceptual explanations seems to be owed to factors of conceptual complexity and primitiveness.
     From: Benjamin Schnieder (Truth-making without Truth-makers [2006], p.33), quoted by David Liggins - Truth-makers and dependence 10.2
     A reaction: Schnieder proposes that there are just 'causal' and 'conceptual' explanations. Liggins objects that there are other types of dependence which offer explanations.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
     Full Idea: It is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor.
     From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.40)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very nice and true generalisation, even though Davidson mentions "no man is an island" as a counterexample. We thirst for meaning, and switch to a second meaning when the first one looks peculiar.
Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
     From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.29)
     A reaction: This is good news for literature studies courses. Davidson's point is that the metaphor itself only gives you a literal meaning, so it doesn't tell you how to interpret it. It seems an attractive proposal.
Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.
     From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.30)
     A reaction: This pronouncement must be the result of Davidson anguishing over the truth conditions for metaphors, which are usually either taken to have a 'metaphorical meaning', or to be abbreviated similes. He solved his problem at a stroke! Plausible.