Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Are Persons Bodies?' and 'Morality and the emotions'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7566 The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
3238 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
     From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
     A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.
3239 You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
     From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
     A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
24008 Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for or addition to how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.223)
     A reaction: Williams aims to rescue emotion from the emotivists, and replace it at the centre of traditional modes of moral judgement. I suppose we could assess one rogue robot as behaving 'badly' in a community of robots.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
24009 Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If moral education does not revolve around what to fear, to be angry about, to despise, and where to draw the line between kindness and a stupid sentimentality - I do not know what it is. (Though there are principles, of truth-telling and justice).
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: He cites Aristotle as the obvious source of this correct idea. The examples of principle both require us to place a high value on truth and justice, and not just follow rules in the style of arithmetic.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Emotivism held that there were two purposes of moral judgements: to express the emotions of the speaker, and to influence the emotions of his hearers.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.209)
     A reaction: I take Ayer to be typical of the first project, and Hare of the second. The theory is much more plausible when the second aim is added. Would we ever utter a moral opinion if we didn't hope to influence someone?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a certain moral woodenness or even insolence in Kant's blank regard for consistency. It smacks of Keynes's Principle of Unfairness - that if you can't do a good turn to everybody, you shouldn't do it to anybody.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.226)
     A reaction: He says it also turns each of us into a Supreme Legislator, which deifies man. It is clearly not the case that morality consists entirely of rules and principles, but Williams recognises their role, in truth-telling for example.