8 ideas
| 5437 | The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey] |
| Full Idea: The claim of hermeneutics to give understanding instead of explanation can be seen as part of the theory of knowledge, but it seems to be incompatible with the most accepted aspects of positivism. | |
| From: comment on Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.248 | |
| A reaction: So much the worse for positivism. The same conflict occurs in modern philosophy of mind. God can be a positivist if he likes, but we must settle for hermeneutics for a lot of our knowledge. We are discussing method, not ontology. |
| 7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
| Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle. | |
| From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed. |
| 5436 | Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner] |
| Full Idea: In the natural sciences we seek for causes and ask for explanation (erklären), but in the human or cultural sciences we seek understanding (verstehen) by means of interpretation. | |
| From: report of Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.144 | |
| A reaction: This seems a nice distinction. The prospects of finding the causes or explanations of Shakespeare's plays don't look good, and when you have explained the causes of a chemical reaction you probably have all you need. |
| 24008 | Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for or addition to how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.223) | |
| A reaction: Williams aims to rescue emotion from the emotivists, and replace it at the centre of traditional modes of moral judgement. I suppose we could assess one rogue robot as behaving 'badly' in a community of robots. |
| 24009 | Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If moral education does not revolve around what to fear, to be angry about, to despise, and where to draw the line between kindness and a stupid sentimentality - I do not know what it is. (Though there are principles, of truth-telling and justice). | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225) | |
| A reaction: He cites Aristotle as the obvious source of this correct idea. The examples of principle both require us to place a high value on truth and justice, and not just follow rules in the style of arithmetic. |
| 24007 | Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Emotivism held that there were two purposes of moral judgements: to express the emotions of the speaker, and to influence the emotions of his hearers. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.209) | |
| A reaction: I take Ayer to be typical of the first project, and Hare of the second. The theory is much more plausible when the second aim is added. Would we ever utter a moral opinion if we didn't hope to influence someone? |
| 24010 | An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225) | |
| A reaction: So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them. |
| 24012 | Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is a certain moral woodenness or even insolence in Kant's blank regard for consistency. It smacks of Keynes's Principle of Unfairness - that if you can't do a good turn to everybody, you shouldn't do it to anybody. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.226) | |
| A reaction: He says it also turns each of us into a Supreme Legislator, which deifies man. It is clearly not the case that morality consists entirely of rules and principles, but Williams recognises their role, in truth-telling for example. |