Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Noneism or Allism?' and 'Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Substitutionalists simulate quantification over fictional characters by quantifying for real over fictional names.
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159)
     A reaction: I would say that a fiction is a file of conceptual information, identified by a label. The label brings baggage with it, and there is no existence in the label.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15534 We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We can quantify over Meinongian objects by quantifying for real over property bundles (such as the bundle of roundness and squareness).
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.159)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
15532 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
     Full Idea: An expansive friend of the controversial entities who says they all exist may be called an 'allist'; a tough desert-dweller who says that none of them exist may be called a 'noneist'.
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.152)
     A reaction: Lewis gives examples of the obvious and the controversial entities. Lewis implies that he himself is in between. The word 'desert' is a reference to Quine.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15535 We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If 'existence' is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist, we will have none of it.
     From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.163)
     A reaction: Lewis is a strong advocate, following Quine, of the univocal sense of the word 'exist', and I agree with them.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14381 A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca]
     Full Idea: Yablo proposes the argument that Statue A is essentially a statue, and Lump 1 is not essentially a statue, so Statue A is not identical with Lump 1.
     From: report of Stephen Yablo (Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility [1987]) by Michael della Rocca - Essentialists and Essentialism I
     A reaction: Della Rocca and Yablo unashamedly elide necessary properties with essential properties, so this argument doesn't bother me too much. It concerns the statue and the clay having different modal properties.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7566 The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.