Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Philosophical Studies 1611-19' and 'On the Algebra of Logic'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Prime, common matter seems to be a kind of accessory and to stand as a substratum, whereas any kind of action seems to be a mere emanation of form. So it is that forms are given all the leading parts.
     From: Francis Bacon (Philosophical Studies 1611-19 [1617], p.206), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.2
     A reaction: This is a very striking criticism of hylomorphism. The revolution was simple - that actually matter seems to do all the real work, and the form can take a back seat.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The utility of [truth-functional conditionals] is that it puts us in possession of a rule...[namely] The hypothetical proposition may be ...falsified by a single state of things, but only by one in which A [antecedent] is true and B [consequent] is false.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (On the Algebra of Logic [1895], p.218), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions
     A reaction: Personally I am rather more interested in verifying conditionals than in falsifying them. I certainly don't accept them until they are falsified, unless they have massive support from surrounding facts.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Stripped and passive matter seems nothing more than an invention of the human mind.
     From: Francis Bacon (Philosophical Studies 1611-19 [1617], p.206), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.2
     A reaction: Bacon seems to me to get too little credit in the history of philosophy, because he is just seen as a progenitor of science. His modern views predate most radical 17th C thought by 20 years.