5 ideas
| 7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
| Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle. | |
| From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed. |
| 14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
| Full Idea: Unlike Stalnaker, Lewis holds that indicative conditionals have the truth conditions of material conditionals. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Frank Jackson - Conditionals 'Further' | |
| A reaction: Thus Lewis only uses the possible worlds account for subjunctive conditionals, where Stalnaker uses it for both. Lewis is defending the truth-functional account for the indicative conditionals. |
| 8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
| Full Idea: According to Lewis, a counterfactual holds when the consequent is true in possible worlds very like our own except for the fact that the antecedent is true. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.213 | |
| A reaction: Presumably the world being very like our own would make it unlikely that there would be anything else to cause the consequent, apart from the counterfactual antecedent. |
| 20765 | Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Existentialists no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (Against Dryness: a polemical sketch [1983], p.46), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Subjectivism' | |
| A reaction: It is one thing to deny the values, and another to deny the realities. This piece is a 'polemic', and reads more like an exhortation than a truth. Many of us are, at best, cowardly naked wills. |
| 9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973], 3.3) |