3 ideas
16030 | 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E] |
Full Idea: In the Aristotelian tradition, a 'nominal' definition is a pseudo-definition that identifies the members of the species or genus, but fails to capture the essence, e.g. 'man is the featherless biped'. | |
From: Jan-Erik Jones (Real Essence [2012], §2) | |
A reaction: You can 'individuate' an object as 'the only object in that drawer', while revealing nothing about it. So what must a definition do, in addition to picking something out uniquely? |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle. | |
From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed. |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
Full Idea: There is no important sense in which psychology can be reduced to the physical sciences. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Material Mind [1973], p.259) | |
A reaction: In no 'important' way can the beauty of the Lake District be reduced to geology - but it is geology. 'Important' to whom? To a metaphysician, I would say psychology does reduce to physics, and that is important, but it is not important to a psychologist. |