Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Oxford Commentary on Sentences' and 'Psychology from an empirical standpoint'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16614 Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: From matter and form comes one thing per se. This is not so for subject and accident. Matter and form are instrinsic causes of a composite being, but whiteness and a human being are not. Humans can exist without whiteness, so it is one thing per accidens.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Oxford Commentary on Sentences [1301], II.12.1.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
     A reaction: This isn't much of a theory, but at least it is focusing on an interesting question, and the distinction between genuinely unified, and unified by chance. Compare a loving couple with siblings who hate each other.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7566 The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3364 All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
     Full Idea: Every mental phenomenon contains something as object within itself.
     From: Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874], p. 88), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.21
     A reaction: This gives rise to the slogan that 'intentionality is the mark of the mental', which notoriously seems to miss out the phenomenal aspect of mental life. We note now, though, that even emotions have objects.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
3225 Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
     Full Idea: Brentano's thesis is that all mental phenomena are intentional i.e. representational. Support for this view is that assimilating phenomenal experience to attitudes we explain the essential unity of the mind.
     From: report of Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.5
     A reaction: Unifying intentionality and qualia in a single theory looks like a good move, but which one has priority? Evolutionary theory says priority goes to whatever produces behaviour. My intuition is that qualia are more basic - in tiny insects, say.