58 ideas
| 18330 | Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Ages are to be assessed by their positive forces - and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last great age. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.37) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that Nietzsche places art very high among the positive forces. Science and technology showed barely a glimmer during the Renaissance. Mathematics moved very little, Copernicus was ignored, and logic was static. |
| 2900 | I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I set apart with high reverence the name of Heraclitus. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.2) |
| 2913 | Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. …Sophist culture, by which I mean realist culture, attains in him its perfect expression. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 9.2) |
| 2909 | Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.7) | |
| A reaction: Nice. At its deepest level thinking isn't a rational process? |
| 2892 | Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 26) |
| 2896 | I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' derives. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.04) |
| 2897 | With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: With dialectics the rabble gets on top. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05) |
| 2898 | Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What has first to have itself proved is of little value. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05) |
| 10397 | Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P] |
| Full Idea: Abelard's theory of substantial integral wholes is not a pure mereology in the modern sense, since he holds that there are privileged divisions; ..the division of a whole must be into its principal parts. Some wholes have a natural division. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Peter King - Peter Abelard 2 | |
| A reaction: This is a mereology that cuts nature at the joints, rather than Lewis's 'unrestricted composition', so I find Abelard rather appealing. |
| 18317 | The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The characteristics which have been assigned to the 'real being' of things are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness - the 'real world has been constructed out of the contradiction of the actual world. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a critique of Hegel, in particular. Could we describe the metaphysics of Nietzsche as 'constructivist'? I certainly think he is underrated as a metaphysician, because the ideas are so fragmentary. |
| 18315 | We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Being is everywhere thought in, foisted on, as cause; it is only from the conception 'ego' that there follows, derivatively, the concept 'being'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: 'Being' is such a remote abstraction that I doubt whether we can say anything at all meaningful about where it 'comes from'. |
| 18316 | The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The grounds upon which 'this' world has been designated as apparent establish rather its reality - another kind of reality is absolutely undemonstrable. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) |
| 10396 | If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P] |
| Full Idea: Abelard argued that if the universal 'animal' were completely present in both Socrates and an ass, making each wholly an animal, then the same thing, animal, will be simultaneously rational and irrational, with contraries present in the whole thing. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Peter King - Peter Abelard 2 | |
| A reaction: If we have universals for rationality and irrationality, they can distinguish the two. But we must also say that rationality is not an aspect of animal, which seems to mean that mind isn't either. What is the essence of an animal? Not reason? |
| 10395 | Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P] |
| Full Idea: Abelard was an irrealist about universals, but also about propositions, events, times other than the present, natural kinds, relations, wholes, absolute space, hylomorphic composites, and the like. The concrete individual is enough to populate the world. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Peter King - Peter Abelard 2 | |
| A reaction: If a Nominalist claims that 'only particulars exist', this makes him an extreme nominalist, and remarkably materialistic for his time (though he accepted the soul, as well as God). |
| 15384 | Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
| Full Idea: Abelard concluded that only words can be 'predicated of many'. A universal is nothing but a general linguistic predicate, and its universality depends not on its mode of being, but on its mode of signifying. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Peter' | |
| A reaction: Abelard seems to be the originator of what is now called Predicate Nominalism, with Nelson Goodman as his modern representative. If it is just words, is there no fact of two things having the 'same' property? |
| 18314 | In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It is the metaphysics of language (that is, of reason) ....which believes in the 'ego', in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its belief in the ego-substance on to all things - only thus does it create the concept 'thing'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) |
| 7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
| Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle. | |
| From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed. |
| 8481 | The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.7 | |
| A reaction: Most modern philosophers couldn't (apparently) care less where a concept originated, but one of the principles of this database is that such things do matter. I'm not sure why, but if we want the whole picture, we need the historical picture. |
| 18309 | The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: One for McDowell. |
| 18323 | Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. ...First principle: any explanation is better than none. ...Proof by pleasure ('by potency') as criterion of truth. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: By 'proof by pleasure' he means that we find an explanation so satisfying that we cling to it. I assume it is a criterion of rationality (an epistemic virtue) to reject the principle 'any explanation is better than none'. Negative capability. |
| 18310 | The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The 'highest concepts' ...are the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last fumes of evaporating reality. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: This could be seen as an attack on the aspirations of all of philosophy, which seeks general truths out of the chaos of experience. Should we shut up, then, and just be and do? |
| 20368 | There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The 'individual' ...is an error: he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a 'link in the chain', something merely inherited from the past - he constitutes the entire single line 'man' up to and including himself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.33) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but you can sort of imagine yourself as a culmination of something, rather than as an isolated entity. I'm not sure how that is supposed to affect my behaviour. |
| 2899 | The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays itself as a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or- be absurdly rational. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.10) |
| 15385 | Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard] |
| Full Idea: Abelard's problem is that it is not clear how singular forms could do the job they are supposed to do - to account for abstraction, namely - if they were purely singular aspects. | |
| From: comment on Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Peter' | |
| A reaction: A very nice question! If we say that abstracta are just acquired by ignoring all but that feature in some objects, how do we identify 'that' feature in order to select it? The instances must share something in common to be abstracted. |
| 15383 | Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
| Full Idea: Abelard argued from the commonly accepted definition of a universal as 'what can be predicated of man', that no external thing can ever be predicated of anything. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Peter' | |
| A reaction: It sounds to me as if Abelard is confusing predicates with properties! Maybe no external can be a property of anything, but I take predicates to just be part of what you can say about anything, and that had better included external facts. |
| 18313 | The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: At the beginning stands the great fateful error that the will is something which produces an effect - that will is a faculty.... Today we know it is merely a word. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: This is despite Nietzsche's insistence that 'will to power' is the central fact of active existence. The misreading of Nietzsche is to think that this refers to the conscious exercising of a mental faculty. |
| 20133 | The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The so-called 'motive' is another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness - something alongside the deed which is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deed than to represent them. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: [Leiter gives 'VI.3', but I can't find it] As far as you can get from intellectualism about action, and is more in accord with the picture found in modern neuro-science. No one knows why they are 'interested' in something, and that's the start of it. |
| 18326 | The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who tried to divorce the beautiful from man's pleasure in man would at once feel the ground give way beneath him. The 'beautiful in itself' is not even a concept, merely a phrase. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.19) | |
| A reaction: I love the insult 'not even a concept'! It's like Pauli's 'not even wrong'! |
| 20101 | Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Without music life would be a mistake. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 33) | |
| A reaction: Cf Schopenhauer in Idea 21469. If you, dear reader, don't love music, then I sincerely hope that there is something in your life which can match it. |
| 2902 | Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct for life. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right. There is no reasoning against a moral nihilist, because they seem to have no instinct in favour of life. It is the given of morality. |
| 18311 | Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: For philosophers, the higher must not be allowed to grow out of the lower, must not be allowed to have grown at all ...Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: This is so deep and central that I wrote a paper on it, advocating that the theory of values should focus of value-makers. |
| 18324 | There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: An insight formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever. Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: Not only a slogan for non-cognitivism, but also a clear statement of the error theory about morality, a century before John Mackie. |
| 2904 | The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is of finding guilty. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.7) | |
| A reaction: Michael Frede says free will was invented to feel wholly in charge of our own actions. I doubt whether punishment was the first motive. The will just gives a simple explanation of actions. |
| 2895 | The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The value of life cannot be estimated. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
| A reaction: Military leaders apparently judge that the death of one of their own soldiers is worth between 12 and 20 enemy deaths (so history suggests). How about ransom money? |
| 18322 | When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: I love Nietzsche's ideas about the source of values, and his remarks about the value of life. Other thinkers sound so simplistic in comparison. |
| 2893 | In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: I guess he was having a bad day. Since the whole universe is clearly 'worthless', this judgement must in some sense be correct. But I love my books. |
| 18308 | A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
| A reaction: I take his point to be neither that life is unquestionably valuable nor that it is valueless, but that the very question is ridiculous. If we live, we value living. Sounds right. |
| 2894 | Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against it, can in the last resort never be true. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
| A reaction: I suppose this is in the same spirit as judging whether celery tastes nice. Are you for or against the Moon? |
| 18321 | To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One would have to be situated outside life ....[and yet know it thoroughly] ....to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: Can practising artists question the value of their art? The whole point of objectivity is that we can mentally step 'outside' of something, without actually withdrawing from it. |
| 18319 | Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The spiritualization of sensuality is called 'love': it is a great triumph over Christianity. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: I'm not quite clear what 'spiritualization' means, particularly when it comes from Nietzsche. |
| 2903 | A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A well-constituted human being, a 'happy one', must perform certain actions and shrink from other actions. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice reversal of basic Aristotle, though Aristotle does say that the truly virtuous person is happy in their actions. Treat unhappy people with caution! |
| 2891 | Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 12) | |
| A reaction: The Danes keeping being voted the happiest nation, so presumably that results from some sort of effort on their part. The easiest is happiness is to achieve security, then do nothing. |
| 18327 | A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: An 'altruistic' morality, a morality under which egoism languishes - is under all circumstances a bad sign. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.35) |
| 15606 | Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: From the military school of life. - What does not kill me makes me stronger. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 08) | |
| A reaction: The published version! Perhaps the most famous remark in all of Nietzsche, and no one realises it is ironic! It is a sarcastic remark about the battering ram mentality of the Prussian militarist! He had served in the army. |
| 18328 | Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The invalid is a parasite on society. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36) | |
| A reaction: I'll skip the rest, but you get the idea. The point (with which I sympathise) is that life is primarily about what healthy people do. Something has gone wrong if all we do is worry about the sick and the suffering. |
| 18331 | Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organise. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39) | |
| A reaction: Even when Nietzsche is wrong (and who knows, here?) he always challenges you to think! |
| 18332 | The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to centuries-long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding generations. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a lovely challenge to Popper, who seems to have been a liberal who pinned his faith on institutions. |
| 2911 | True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'Equality for equals, inequality for unequals' - that would be the true voice of justice. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.48) |
| 18320 | To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One has renounced grand life when one renounces war. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche was a medical orderly in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, so he had seen it at first hand. I think the machine gun and the heavy bomber would have changed his attitude to warfare. He sounds a bit silly now. Nostalgia for the Iliad. |
| 2908 | There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is a need for educators who are themselves educated. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.5) |
| 18329 | Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We have no power to prevent ourselves being born: but we can rectify this error - for sometimes it is an error. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36) |
| 2905 | 'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
| 10398 | Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P] |
| Full Idea: In Abelard's view a natural kind is a well-defined collection of things that have the same features, so that natural kinds have no special status, being no more than discrete integral wholes whose principle of membership is similarity. | |
| From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Peter King - Peter Abelard 2 | |
| A reaction: I take a natural kind to be a completely stable and invariant class of things. Presumably this invariance has an underlying explanation, but Abelard seems to take the Humean line that we cannot penetrate beyond the experienced surface. |
| 18312 | The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The supreme concepts of philosophers cannot be incommensurate with one another, be incompatible with one another... Thus they acquired their stupendous concept 'God'.... The last, thinnest, emptiest is placed as the first, as cause in itself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) |
| 2906 | By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We deny God; in denying God we deny accountability; only by doing that do we redeem the world. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
| 2901 | How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The primitive church fought against the 'intelligent' in favour of the 'poor in spirit': how could one expect from it an intelligent war against passion? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.1) |
| 18325 | Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know what is good for him and what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.05) |
| 18318 | People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: If there is a strong instinct for slandering, disparaging and accusing life within us, then we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of 'another', a 'better' life. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) |