6 ideas
8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
Full Idea: The arithmetic of ratios and irrational and imaginary numbers can all be reduced by definition to the theory of classes of positive integers, and this can in turn be reduced to pure set theory. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.53) | |
A reaction: This summarises Quine's ontology of mathematics, which tries to eliminate virtually everything, but has to affirm the existence of sets. Can you count sets and their members, if the sets are used to define the numbers? |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle. | |
From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed. |
18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
Full Idea: Whenever we have an equivalence relation among things - such as similarity in a certain respect - we can abstract under the equivalence and consider the abstractum. | |
From: Peter Simons (Modes of Extension: comment on Fine [2008], p.19) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as dressing up old-fashioned psychological abstractionism in the respectable clothing of Fregean equivalences (such as 'directions'). We can actually do what Simons wants without the precision of partitioned equivalence classes. |
18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
Full Idea: Abstraction as a cognitive tool has been associated predominantly with the metaphysics of universals and of mathematical objects such as numbers. But it is more widely applicable beyond this standard range. I commend its judicious use. | |
From: Peter Simons (Modes of Extension: comment on Fine [2008], p.21) | |
A reaction: Personally I think our view of the world is founded on three psychological principles: abstraction, idealisation and generalisation. You can try to give them rigour, as 'equivalence classes', or 'universal quantifications', if it makes you feel better. |
8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
Full Idea: Meaning is essence divorced from the thing and wedded to the word. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51) | |
A reaction: Quine's strategy is that a demolition of essences will be a definition of meaning. Personally I would like to defend essences, though I admit to finding meaning tricky. That is because essences are external, but meanings are in minds. |
8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
Full Idea: The distinction between what belongs to the meaning of a word and what counts as further information is scarcely clearer than the distinction between the essence of a thing and its accidents. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51) | |
A reaction: In lots of cases the distinction between essence and accident strikes me as totally clear. Tricky borderline cases don't destroy a distinction. That bachelors are married is clearly not 'further information'. |