Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Free Will as Involving Determinism' and 'Process Philosophy'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


7 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt]
     Full Idea: Process philosophy is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality and our place within it.
     From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Put like that, the chief ancestor of this approach would be Leibniz, even though his central idea concerns substances. Heraclitus is the most famous ancestor of Process Philosophy. Powers are dynamic, but powers of what?
Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt]
     Full Idea: On the reductionist view of processes, they are all 'owned' and we identify them by their owner (such as the murder of Caesar), ...but many processes (e.g. tornadoes, lightning bolts, the NY rush hour) lack a proper 'subject' altogether.
     From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a fairly conclusive refutation of the view that processes are just objects changing their properties.
Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt]
     Full Idea: Instead of very small things (atoms) combining to produce standard processes (snowstorms), modern physics envisions very small processes (quantum phenomena) combining to produce standard things.
     From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], 4 (i))
     A reaction: Though electrons seem to be distinct things with a fixed set of properties, so this is not a clear point. Where do fields come into it? Beware of citing quantum mechanics in metaphysics!
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot]
     Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent.
     From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63)
     A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
     Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational.
     From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66)
     A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
     Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing.
     From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69)
     A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'.