Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Philosophy as a way of life' and 'Against the Mathematicians'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
     Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7)
     A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
     Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3)
     A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
     Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
     From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Dogmatists say something can be its own criterion. The straight is the standard of itself, and a set of scales establishes the equality of other things and of itself, and light seems to reveal not just other things but also itself.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 442)
     A reaction: Each of these may be a bit dubious, but deserves careful discussion.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The dogmatists ask how the sceptic can show there is no criterion. If without a criterion, he is untrustworthy; with a criterion he is turned upside down. He says there is no criterion, but accepts a criterion to establish this.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 440)
     A reaction: This is also the classic difficulty for foundationalist views of knowledge. Is the foundation justified, or not?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
     Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1)
     A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one.