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All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Certain Physical Essays' and 'Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

12712	Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

7566	The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
	Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle.
	From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation

16736	Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
	Full Idea: Generally speaking, to render a reason of an effect or phenomenon is to deduce it from something else in nature more known than itself, and consequently there may be diverse kinds of degrees of explication of the same thing.
	From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
	A reaction: There is a picture of a real explanatory structure to nature, from which we pick bits that interest us for entirely pragmatic reasons. Boyle and I are as one on this matter.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation

16737	The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
	Full Idea: Explications be most satisfactory that show how the effect is produced by the more primitive affects of matter (bulk, shape and motion) but are not to be despised that deduce them from more familiar qualities such as heat, weight, fluidity, fermentation.
	From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:22), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
	A reaction: [Compressed, and continued from Idea 16736] So there is a causal structure, and the best explanations go to the bottom of it, but lesser explanations only go half way down. So a very skimpy explanation ('dormative power') is still an explanation.

12737	Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.