5 ideas
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis. |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here! |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1) | |
A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.? |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
Full Idea: Various writers have noted that the Identity of Indiscernibles is really tantamount to the verification principle. | |
From: Nicholas Jolley (Leibniz [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Both principles are false, because they are the classic confusion of epistemology and ontology. The fact that you cannot 'discern' a difference between two things doesn't mean that there is no difference. Things beyond verification can still be discussed. |
22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: It is alleged that liberals fail to recognise that people are naturally social or communal. …But liberals believe that people form and join social relations in which they come to understand and pursue the good. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality [1989], Conc) | |
A reaction: This is particulary aimed at communitarians, who see liberalism as based on a distorted concept of people as isolated beings. Personally I am beginning to shift my views from Aristotelian communitarianism to modern liberalism, so I like this idea. |